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ABSTRACT 
Both Japan and Germany have presented security identities of domestic 
antimilitarism throughout their postwar political histories.  Remnants of war memories 
made peoples of both nations strongly antipathetic to waging a war as a way of pursuing 
national security.  They institutionalized such means as constitutions, laws, and civilian 
control of military means.  Among several tenets of security identities, the most basic and 
core tenet was no use of force in foreign war.  Up until the Cold War period, the bans 
remained intact.  However, as changes in the security environment appeared along with 
the end of the Cold War, Japan and Germany relied on the circumstances to consider 
modifying their long-standing antimilitarist approaches to security policies.    
This thesis examines how Japan’s and Germany’s political parties contributed to 
developing new security identities of domestic antimilitarism under the changing security 
environment and foreign expectations.  The main focus of this thesis is finding out the 
answers to how the political parties’ role as representatives of the public, policy makers 
based on their inherent security policy stances, and competitors over the preferred 
policies exerted influence on the evolution of the Japan’s and Germany’s security identity 
of domestic antimilitarism.  
Both nations faced international criticism in the Gulf War due mainly to their 
failures to properly meet the new expectations of the international community.  In 
consideration of lessons learned from the Gulf War, the Afghanistan war (Japan), and the 
Bosnian war (Germany) were the landmark tests for both nations of their abilities to 
rewrite security identities of no use of force in foreign war.  In the end, the expected 
findings of the thesis are that the political parties’ identical positions in view of national 
security and interactions on the political stages played critical roles in preventing 
profound changes in the previous security identities of domestic antimilitarism.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF STUDY 
Japan and Germany have developed similar patterns of antimilitarist identities in 
practicing security policies (security identity of domestic antimilitarism).  Following their 
disastrous defeats in the Second World War, Japan and Germany endured comparable 
experiences as vanquished nations, and subsequently developed a similar antimilitaristic 
ethos that persists today.  Japan and Germany faced post-war occupation periods, 
although their respective occupation experiences differed greatly, particularly in terms of 
the way in which occupation authority was exercised.  Most important, they each took 
initiatives with reference to antimilitarism, not only by their own wills, but also as a 
result of foreign pressures.  This antimilitaristic sentiment is now deeply embedded in the 
psyche of the Japanese and German people.  Both citizens and politicians in Japan and 
Germany have a strong antipathy against a “use of force.”  In addition to a psychological 
feeling of antimilitarism, the way of carrying out security policies are also underlying 
benchmarks standing for the security identities of the domestic antimilitarism of Japan 
and Germany.  For both nations, their security identities of antimilitarism are so firmly 
institutionalized in their constitutions and several resolutions that those identities have 
continued up until the present day and have become the major issues around which the 
security policies of these nations revolve. Therefore, for both Japan and Germany, 
employment of military forces is a last resort to consider as a state activity, except for 
self-defense purposes, when it comes to designing security policies.   
Indeed, no use of force in foreign wars is one of the central tenets underpinning 
the security identity of antimilitarism.  Yet, nowadays, several recent signs displayed by 
Japan and Germany imply that one tenet of security identity of domestic antimilitarism is 
changing.  For example, Japan dispatched its Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) 
outside its territory for the Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq Wars (2003) under United 




in the Bosnian War (1995) under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).  Germany also engaged in combat operations in the Kosovo (1999) and 
Afghanistan Wars (2001).    
This thesis begins with descriptions of the security identity of Japan and Germany 
and descriptions of the conditions that call for changes in their existing security identities.  
It will focus on the role of politicians in renewing the security identity of antimilitarism 
through examination of Japanese and German cases of the use of force in foreign areas.  
The cases will be the Afghanistan War for Japan, and the Bosnian War for Germany.  Its 
main question “how do political parties matter in reproducing security identity of 
domestic antimilitarism?” “What shapes parties’ security policy stance?” and “how does 
contestation over preferred security policy among political parties take place?”  In 
seeking answers to the questions, the author will develop the conceptual lens by which 
each party’s security policy choices are understandable, as well as focus on the process 
through which the debate among political parties takes place.  The author expects to find 
from the case studies is that the security identity of domestic antimilitarism adjusts in 
response to environmental changes. Ultimately, what is emphasized is the overall 
political process and the role of partisan intervention to produce the outcome.   
Finding answers to such questions is of significance for various reasons.  First, in 
security policy, Japan and Germany took cautious steps to change long-held 
antimilitaristic policy stances that were established from the foundation of their nations 
because of their memories of war.  Japan’s and Germany’s decisions on the “use of force 
abroad” are landmark changes that reflects a shift (or at least a modification) of Japan’s 
and Germany’s basic principles guiding security policies.  A change in the principles 
underlying the basic direction of policies rarely happens and thus more deserves 
particular attention.  Second, Japan and Germany are both under the parliamentary 
system.  Unlike a presidential system, where leaders have a fixed tenure and the 
executive branch has strong independent power in decision making, a parliamentary 
system calls on pronounced partisan roles as a center of decision making to be able to 
remove the executive from power.  Third, it is significant to compare and contrast 
Japanese and German cases given that the two cases have similarities as well as 
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differences in various contexts.  In terms of the motivations of war-participation, the 
experiences of the Gulf War played a catalytic role in moving policies toward military 
intervention in foreign areas.  In addition, from a geographical aspect, in the German case, 
the war took place in the vicinity of its own territory, while in the Japanese case the war 
took place far from Japanese territory.  Comparing and contrasting both cases will 
provide suggestions to predict the two nations’ policy courses with various variables 
when put into different situations in the future.   
The thesis puts emphasis on examining Japan’s and Germany’s parties’ national 
identity preferences and security policy preferences established in the parties’ new or re-
organizing periods which made direct contributions to building up the security identity of 
domestic antimilitarism down through their postwar histories.  Understanding the parties’ 
respective logic behind “use of force abroad” debates, in view of party ideology and 
security policy preferences, helps to judge how party ideologies and policy preferences 
matter in the making of security policy.  Additionally, it helps to predict their course of 
security activities in the future.  This thesis offers outlines of political parties’ ideologies 
and policy preferences in the security realm, and takes a cautious look at negotiations for 
adoptions of new sets of security identities. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The populations of Japan and Germany both maintain strong antimilitaristic 
sentiments.  Since the end of WWII, the foundation of both countries has been an 
aversion toward the use of military force.  With hideous memories of the carnage and ruin 
caused by nuclear attacks, and the feeling of having been victimized by the imperial 
military, the Japanese people developed intense antimilitaristic sentiments.  New post-
WWII leaders had to formulate a new state identity which enshrined a sense of 
antimilitarism.  The Yoshida doctrine was representative of these strategic calculations.  
The Yoshida doctrine provided guidance and a strategic trajectory for the formulation of 
foreign, defense, security, and economic policy.  It articulated overall policy planning 
which mainly focused on the economic recovery program and allowed for reduced 
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defense expenditures.  This focus was made possible because of the U.S.-Japan alliance.1  
Similarly, the first Chancellor of post-war Germany, Konrad Adenauer, pursued the 
integration of Germany into the international, multilateral security structure, attainment 
of legitimate status in the international community while rectifying Germany’s Nazi 
legacy and reconstruction of the economy based on U.S. financial aid.2  Shortly after their 
catastrophic defeats in the war, both nations framed their constitutions—the Peace 
Constitution in Japan, the Basic Law in Germany—with provisions of constraints on the 
use of armed force circumscribing military roles in line with defensive purposes in the 
case of Germany and with a provision of renunciation of war in the case of Japan.  As 
discussed above, postwar Japanese and German policy makers adopted, implemented and 
consolidated the idea of antimilitarism and institutionalized it in the process of security 
policy making.  Accordingly, they could develop security identities of domestic 
antimilitarism.    
Japan and Germany share central tenets of their security identities of domestic 
antimilitarism—“no use of force except in self-defense,” “no participation in foreign 
war.”3  Up to the early 1990s, the original antimilitaristic approaches to the security 
policies of Japan and Germany continued to be maintained, but after the Cold War, 
several indicators demonstrated that the Japanese and German security identities were 
moving toward a different course in the form of the revision of security objectives and 
adoption of a new military paradigm.  Recent examples of this change are the foreign 
deployment of the Japanese Self -Defense Force (JSDF) to Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq 
(2004) in the case of Japan; and the Bundeswehr’s participation in the Kosovo war (1999)  
 
 
                                                 
1 Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain 
Power, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 11–12. 
2 Paul Belkin, “German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications,” CRS 
Report for Congress, (Washington, 2008), 3-4; Donald Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed: 
German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment, (Berlin: Carola 
Hartmann Miles, 2007), 83; Christoph Bluth, Germany and the Future of European Security, (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 53. 
3 Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice, 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008), 34.   
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and Afghan War (2001) in the case of Germany.  Several schools of thought presented 
reasons for these unexpected courses of action on which Japan and Germany embarked 
since the end of the Cold War.   
First, rationalists placed focus on the fact that domestic politics of security policy 
making were influenced by international relations.  From the rationalist standpoint, the 
two states’ behaviors were driven by the undifferentiated consideration of national 
interests. They were also driven by taking the other’s intentions into account under the 
structure of the international system.4  By international-level explanation, given the rise 
of Japan and Germany during the Cold War period as giant economic powers, the change 
in security identity of domestic antimilitarism is attributed the motivation to play a 
greater military role in international politics commensurate with their enhanced economic  
capabilities.  Rationalists expected “normalization” of Japan’s and Germany’s restricted 
security practices that dominantly appeared between the post-World War and post-Cold 
War period.  These arguments cannot explain political parties’ roles and influences on 
security policy making since they focused only on domestic politics based on an 
international context.  Furthermore, rationalists’ explanation cannot explain why Japan’s 
and Germany’s security identity of domestic antimilitarism has not changed completely 
and why restrictions on security policy areas still remain.     
 
                                                 
4 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); For example, 
representative rationalists (John Mearsheimer), believe that a unified Germany would struggle to obtain 
nuclear weapons and heighten its military status by virtue of its economic prosperity (John J. Mearsheimer, 
“Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 [Summer 
1990]: 35–36).  In the same sense, Kenneth Waltz argues that Japan and Germany try to enhance their 
military capabilities and military roles in response to their growing economic wealth, and that they will 
ultimately have nuclear weapons.  In addition, he mentions that the incremental international contributions 
of Japan and Germany will conclude in changes in international structure (Kenneth N. Waltz, The 
Emerging Structure of International Politics, International Security 18, no. 2 [Autumn 1993]: 55-61). 
Richard Betts claims that as long as China continues to grow economically, Japan will become a balancer 
in East Asia, with its large economy and advanced technology (Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and 
Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,” International Security 18, no. 3 [Winter 
1993/4]:  61).  Michael J. Green also claims that if the international status quo surrounding Japan were to 
break down, it might try to either balance against or challenge the United States (Michael J. Green, “State 
of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy,” Access Asia Review, [September 1998]). Green 
reiterates in another volume that in the process of pursuing normal security policies, Japan will sooner or 
later expand participation in peacekeeping operations, and will try to revise its Constitution (Michael J. 
Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Area of Uncertain Power, [New York: 
Palgrave, 2001], 272–273). 
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Second, constructivists take a normative or cultural approach to an explanation of 
domestic policy making.  From the constructivists’ point of view, norms or cultures 
function in shaping specific types of security practices over time.  In dealing with the 
specific cases of Japan and Germany, they emphasize the role of norms or cultures of 
antimilitarism deeply rooted in both nations.5   The constructivists’ explanation sheds 
light on the question of why certain kinds of restrictions were newly imposed when the 
overseas deployment of military forces was determined.  However, this argument is not 
enough to account for who makes and institutionalizes a particular security identity and 
who puts that security identity into practice.  As well, constructivists are inclined to coin 
political parties’ positions in undifferentiated manners because of their assumptions that 
widely perceived norms, dominant cultures, and common historical experiences exert 
constraining influences on every party equally.  With such an argument, processes of 
adoption, negotiation, implementation and revision of security identity among parties are 
not accountable.  
A focal point of what both rationalists and constructivists take into account is the 
outcome of a state’s behavior.  For them, each party uniformly behaves as a unitary actor 
in the international system or each party’s behaviors and perspectives are uniformly 
constrained by imposed norms and cultures.  With such approaches, when it comes to 
making behavioral predictions in the security realm, a party itself is less driven for 
attention because its respective positions are assumed to be constant across time as well  
 
 
                                                 
5 Constructivists, like Peter J. Katzenstein and Berger, link norms and culture with security policies.  
Berger points out that Japan’s and Germany’s constitutions and collective security settings reinforce their 
antimilitaristic character and endow momentum to maintain it over the long haul (Thomas U. Berger, 
Culture of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, [Maryland: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1998], 30–32). Similarly, Katzenstein argues that institutionalized norms will prevent Japan from 
becoming a nuclear power, and will constrain infinite military buildup and aggressive military roles (Peter J. 
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, [Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996]), 2–18). John S. Duffield, in particular, emphasizes the role of security culture in 
implementing German security policies.  He indicates that in spite of considerable changes in the security 
environment after unification, German security policies continue to be constrained along existing policy 
lines, and Germany has not become aggressive as realists predicted due to its “international institutions” 
(such as European Union and NATO) and “postwar security culture”(culture of antimilitarism) (John S. 
Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, Security Policy after Unification, [Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998], 233–241). 
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as across government change.  By contrast, the thesis will show how each party’s security 
policy stance is formulated and diverges, one from another, and shows how parties’ 
respective alternatives are negotiated on the political stage.     
Two main points here are the role of the party as a policy seeker and typology of 
diverged parties’ positions in line with their security policy preferences.  By the 
examination of partisan activities in security policy making, ultimately, it proves that the 
parties make a greater contribution to reproducing the security identity of domestic 
antimilitarism facing multiple, dramatic changes in the country’s security environment 
over time. Also deserving attention is the differing security environment challenges’ 
consistent ways of applying the security identity of domestic antimilitarism in Japan and 
Germany.  Subsequently, the new security environment sets a condition under which 
parties’ interactions over security issues are begun.  In the end, the thesis’ primary 
approach to party politics will combine the rationalists’ argument about the linkage 
between domestic politics and international relations with the constructivists’ argument 
about the impact of norms and cultures. 
This thesis argues that political parties in Japan and Germany play a leading role 
in the evolution of the security identity of domestic antimilitarism.  An examination of 
the cases with respect to the JSDF’s and Bundeswehr’s participation in war entails not 
only political negotiations but also divergence in parties’ positions as policy seekers 
based on their security policy preferences.  In particular, the Afghanistan and Bosnian 
Wars were excellent cases to test parties’ role in the changing security identity of 
domestic militarism for the following significant reasons.  First of all, no party had yet 
stood by identical positions in which they responded to the question of the military 
intervention.  The two wars ordered parties to shape positions on the topic.  In this regard, 
it is useful to test what factors influenced parties’ own positions on security matters.  
Second, as no case had existed to challenge Japanese and German security identities of 
use of force in foreign war by that time, no set of criteria existed about conditions under 
which parties might as well reach consensus over international military contributions.  
All parties’ positions on the issue had greater influence on shaping new sets of criteria 
with regard to military interventions.  Also, parties’ interactions at the cabinet level as 
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well as at the parliamentary level prohibited one dominant party’s position from 
representing the new criteria.  Thus, the cases of the Afghanistan and Bosnian Wars are 
useful to test what role parties played when security identities were challenged and 
revised.  The respective parties’ positions will be classified by tracing their prioritized 
national identities and by tracing the parties’ particular framework within which security 
policies are constrained or considered (security policy stance).  This thesis expects to find 
that political negotiations on security issues are based on the parties’ own preferred 
positions and are a key to keeping their security identity consistent despite confronting 
various challenges.      
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
This thesis tests parties’ roles as  policy seekers as well as  key players in  keeping 
or renewing security identity while examining partisan contests over the security issue of 
the use of force abroad in Afghanistan (Japan) and Bosnian (Germany) Wars.  The first 
step is to build a theoretical framework within which each party’s security policy 
preferences can be explained in order to conceptualize rationales with which parties make 
security policy.  This step involves examinations of parties’ national identity preferences 
and suggestions of key variables by which parties are identified with reference to their 
security policy stance - examples of key variables are party’s position on the security 
institution, or a party’s position on the use of forces.  The next step is to apply the 
suggested framework to each party.  The third step is to examine the negotiation 
processes among parties with different positions in the security realm.  This step involves 
cabinet-level debates between senior and junior coalition parties and parliamentary-level 
debates between ruling and opposition parties.  This step will show the process through 
which parties’ preferred policies are negotiated and compromised, and show whether the 
outcome of the policy remains consistent with the existing security identity of domestic 
antimilitarism.   
In order to test parties’ role more effectively, the two cases are assumed to consist 
of similar conditions–first, changes in external security environments, e.g., end of the  
 
 9
Cold War, reunification of West-East Germany; second, foreign pressures to put both 
nations to take action; third, a shift in public opinion from blind opposition to the use of 
force to conditional support for it.   
The thesis will consist of five chapters including the introductory chapter.  
Chapter II will describe the analytical framework.  This chapter will discuss the concepts 
of antimilitarism, security identity, and security identity of domestic antimilitarism.  It 
will also discuss the institutionalized security identity of domestic antimilitarism in Japan 
and Germany by examining the constitutions and several resolutions articulating 
restrictions on security practices.  Subsequently, Chapter II will cover the role of political 
parties as policy seekers and will discuss what national identity preferences mean and 
what kinds of fundamental variables exist when it comes to building security policy 
preferences.  Finally, this chapter will analyze Japanese and German parties’ respective 
party national identity preferences and security policy preferences.  Chapters III and IV 
will deliver how parties matter in the face of fundamental challenges as opposed to their 
security identity of domestic antimilitarism with the case studies of Japan and Germany.  
Each case study will include external conditions that call for adopting a different way of 
exercising the security identity of domestic antimilitarism.  Subsequently, it will deal 
with how parties made their policies based on their security policy preferences and how 
they debated the final decision at the cabinet-level and at the parliamentary-level.  
Chapter V will conclude.  It will compare and contrast findings from the two case studies 
and offer implications for future policy predictions.    
 10
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 11
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. SECURITY IDENTITY OF DOMESTIC ANTIMILITARISM 
1. What is Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism?  
This section articulates concepts of security identity, antimilitarism, and security 
identity of domestic antimilitarism.  The explanations of these concepts are based on 
Oros’ volume and his definitions.  
As Oros defined, security identity is a “set of collectively held principles that have 
attracted broad political support regarding the appropriate role of state action in the 
security arena and are institutionalized into the policy-making process.”6   When a certain 
security identity gains dominant support from a wide range of political actors and major 
societal actors, it becomes a hegemonic security identity that represents one state’s 
security identity.  Once a security identity becomes hegemonic, it provides an 
overarching framework under which a state shapes its security policy practices.7 
Oros differentiated the concept of security identity from that of norms, ideas, 
ideology, and culture.8  Ideology is a more general concept than security identity in that it 
refers to universally shared beliefs that individuals perceive, but security identity consists 
of shared principles that are adopted, implemented, and institutionalized in a state system.  
Security identity is also different from ideas.  In addition, whereas ideas give a certain 
“road map” for policy decisions on a case by case basis, security identity gives a “sense 
of coherence to policies by making certain policy options more desirable than others.”9  
As well, security identity and norms have differences, in terms of the fact that norms 
propose a set of goals to be accomplished by policies, but security identity proposes a 
way by which goals are accomplished given the framework.  In this regard, security 
                                                 
6 Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice, 
(Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 2008), 9. 
7 Ibid., 9–10. 
8 Ibid., 10–11. 
9 Ibid., 10. 
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identity is also discernable from culture as it sets boundaries for appropriate political 
actions rather than setting norms and goals as culture normally provides. 
Before further discussion on the security identity of domestic antimilitarism, the 
concept of antimilitarism warrants discussing.  Antimilitarism is an anti-war sentiment 
which is embedded in one’s psyche.  Antimilitarism represents a distinct characteristic of 
antipathy that individuals, organizations, and states have against war.10  Theoretically, a 
concept of antimilitarism has a connotation of opposition to war itself, but practically, it 
is broadly used to mean opposition to all military-related matters, i.e., having military 
capabilities or undertaking military activities.11  When it comes to taking state-level 
analysis into account, antimilitarism exclusively denies accepting any military means as a 
part of state activities.12 
Security identity of domestic antimilitarism is a forged term for describing a 
modified identity of antimilitarism in order to garner openly accepted military activity as 
opposed to a pure sense of antimilitarism, which is not open to employing any military 
means as national security policy options.  The concept of security identity of domestic 
antimilitarism focuses on “limits to the reemergence of militarist elements at home, yet 
still accepting as legitimate a defensive role for a military.”13   As security identity 
provides a set of boundaries under which states shape security policy practices, security 
identity of domestic antimilitarism provides a framework for appropriate actions in the 
security policy arena based on antimilitarist aspects of security policy.14  It is not a final 
goal that political actors have to achieve, but rather it is an overarching framework that 
gives directions based on of antimilitarism.   
                                                 
10 William Schneider, “The Beginning of Ideology?” Foreign Policy, no.17 (Winter 1974–1975): 111. 
11 Alvin D. Cox, “Evidences of Antimilitarism in Prewar and Wartime Japan,” Pacific Affairs 46, no. 
4 (Winter 1973–1974): 502. 
12 Andrew L. Oros, op. cit., 6. 
13 Ibid., 6. 
14 Ibid., 12. 
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2. Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism in Japan and Germany  
Antimilitarism emerged in Japan and Germany followed by their defeats in WWII.  
Both nations had experiences in common of mass destruction of their territory in the 
wake of the war.  Germany was attacked by aerial bombardments from the allied forces 
resulting in six and a half million casualties; in the case of Japan, two major cities were 
attacked by atomic bombs, and the country suffered approximately eight million 
casualties on all battlefields.  Moreover, many of the established economic-social 
infrastructures were destroyed, and as a result of unconditional surrenders, both countries 
lost considerable territory.  These factors all contributed to the emergence of 
antimilitarism in the German and the Japanese psyche.  The antimilitarism of Japan and 
Germany spread, not only through individual mindsets, but through organizations such as 
pacifist political parties whose degrees of acceptance of the antimilitarist ethos were 
different from one another. 
Based on common military-historical backgrounds, Japan and Germany adopted 
and maintained security identities of domestic antimilitarism after the end of WWII.  
There are three central tenets to Japan’s and Germany’s postwar security identities of 
domestic antimilitarism.  Their respective tenets differ slightly from each other.    
 
Table 1.   Central tenets of Japan’s and Germany’s security identity of domestic 
antimilitarism (After: Oros, 2008, 45; Duffield, 1998, 43) 
Japan 1. No traditional armed forces involved in domestic policymaking  
2. No use of force by Japan to resolve international disputes, except in 
self-defense 
3. No Japanese participation in foreign wars 
Germany 1. Civilian control and Innere Fuhrung 
2. Exclusively use force for self-defense 
3. Little interest in out-of-area strategic involvements 
 
The first tenet of Japan and Germany is designated by complete obedience to 
‘civilian control.’15  In the case of Japan, up until 2007 when the Ministry of Defense 
                                                 
15 Thomas U. Berger, op. cit., 50. 
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(MOD) was established, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was not granted full 
ministerial stature under the administrative supervision of the Prime Minister.16  The JDA 
positions were filled with officials from other institutions such as Ministry of Foreign 
Affair (MOFA), Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and Ministry of 
Finance (MOF).  The Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) was under the supervision of 
the Internal Bureau (IB).  Even after the creation of the MOD, the seconded officials, as 
compared to other ministries, were still in most high positions.  In the case of Germany, 
senior positions in the MOD were assigned by a defense minister and two secretaries who 
were all civilians.  Among four branches in the MOD, only one branch was headed by a 
professional military officer; an independent office of the parliamentary commissioner 
took responsibility to monitor the military. 17   Apart from institutionalized methods, 
Germany introduced a concept of “Innere Fuhrung (internal leadership).”18   The concept 
of Innere Fuhrung was launched by the democratic civil-military reform of the Basic Law 
(1954-1957) which intended to distance the military institution from the Nazi legacy.  It 
ordered new soldiers to “no longer fight on the basis of zombie-like obedience but out of 
an inner conviction and belief in the values of freedom and democracy.”19   Innere 
Fuhrung became the moral principle of German soldiers afterward and it was the 
principal tool used to legitimize the creation of armed forces in Germany.   
The second tenet of both Japan and Germany accounted for the use of military 
forces for the purpose of self-defense.  This tenet is institutionalized in the Japanese and 
German constitutions.  Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounced the state’s right 
to use military force to solve conflicts with foreign nations.   In a similar vein, the 
German Basic Law stipulated that the armed forces would be used only for national 
defense.  The detailed content of both nations’ constitutions will be introduced in the next 
part of this discussion.   
                                                 
16 Yuki Tatsumi, Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure, (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. 
Stimson Center, 2008), 34.   
17 Thomas U. Berger, op. cit., 50.   
18 Donald Abenheim, Soldier and Politics Transformed, (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2007), 88. 
19 Thomas U. Berger, op. cit., 52. 
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The third tenet circumscribes a possible range for employing military forces.  A 
ban on the overseas dispatch of SDF was institutionalized by the self defense law written 
when the SDF was created by Japan in 1954.20  In addition, based on Article 9 of the 
Constitution, the Japanese government officially announced that the Japanese Self 
Defense Forces (JSDF) was constitutionally prohibited from joining in the exercise of the 
right of collective self defense.21   By interpretation, Japan relinquished the right to 
engage in third-party disputes.  In the case of Germany, Article 24 of the Basic Law 
allowed the integration of German security into a “system of mutual collective security.”  
Thus, Germany was given greater room for maneuvering when it comes to use forces in 
foreign countries.  The Basic Law contained Article 87a which stated that the use of 
armed forces was strictly prohibited other than for defense purposes.  Thus, official 
German interpretation of the constitution up until the 1990s saw that external use of the 
armed forces except for defense purposes within the NATO area was prohibited.22  The 
third tenet has been tested, in particular in the aftermath of the Cold War.  German 
participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, in the Bosnian, Kosovo, and Afghanistan 
Wars, and Japanese participation in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars exemplifies the 
breach of the tenet.  This thesis focuses on the challenges of exercising the third tenet – 
no use of force in foreign war - from an international context.  Japan and Germany were 
placed in situations where maintenance of the third tenet was difficult for various reasons, 
due to external structural changes and increases in foreign expectations.  The process 
through which the third tenet of “no use of military forces in foreign war” is revised is the 
main focus of the thesis.   
                                                 
20 Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., The Politics of Defense in Japan, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), 32. 
21 Akiho Shibata, “Japan: Moderate Commitment Within Legal Structures,” in Democratic 
Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law, eds. Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 212. 
22 George Nolte, “Germany: Ensuring Political Legitimacy for the Use of Military Forces by 
Requiring Constitutional Accountability,” in Ibid., 236. 
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3. The Institutionalized Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism in 
Japan and Germany 
A key method of the institutionalization of the security identity of domestic 
antimilitarism is the constitution, law, and resolutions.  Japan and Germany had 
constitutions which had been rewritten in the immediate postwar period.  Each of the 
constitutions had specific contents that prohibited the two nations from reemerging as 
military powers in the international community.    
a. Japan  
The Peace Constitution was chiefly drafted under the guardianship of the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Power, General MacArthur, and the main work was 
charged to the Government Section’s committee of twenty-four U.S. military and 
civilians led by Major General Courtney Whitney.  It was presented to the Japanese 
government for review and accepted within ten days of its delivery to the Japanese. 23   
One of the cardinal principles grounded in the Constitution was the 
abolishment of waging war for the sake of national interests.  It clearly stated that “Japan 
would renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation.”24   
Article 9 of the constitution, ‘The Renunciation of War’, reads as follows: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In 
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.  The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
To interpret its meaning, Japan would relinquish the right to build or 
maintain a military (Army, Navy, and Air Force) as well as the right to use military force 
as a sovereign means for any reasons including defense purposes.  After its promulgation, 
Japanese governments since the 1950s have revised the interpretation of Article 9 from 
                                                 
23 Robert E. Ward, “The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution,” The American Political 
Science Review 50, no. 4 (December 1956): 980–1010.   
24 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Post-War Security Trajectory and Policy System, (London: 
Routledge, 2009). 
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its original meaning, by permitting the government’s right to seek self-defense and to 
maintain the JSDF for exercising self-defense actions under the U.N. Charter. 25  
Although the Constitutional interpretation still raises debates among Diet members, it is 
still a cornerstone that bolsters Japan’s security identity of domestic antimilitarism.  
Moreover,   there are several institutionalized resolutions other than the 
Constitution that consolidate the practice of security policies based on the security 
identity of domestic antimilitarism.  The first resolution is the “ban on overseas dispatch” 
which was established in 1954.26  This law banned engagement in international disputes 
and third party conflicts by Japanese military forces.  Also, it is inferred that Japanese 
troops would not be dispatched outside Japanese territory in support of the United States.   
The second resolution is the ban on arms exports.  Prime Minister Sato 
announced (1967) that Japan would not export arms to communist states, countries under 
U.N. sanctions, and parties to international disputes.  Prime Minister Miki Takeo (1976) 
further applied this restriction to all nations, and additionally announced prohibiting all 
weapons-related technology as well as dual-use (civil-military) technologies from 
export.27   
The third institutionalized resolution concerns the three non-nuclear 
principles: no production, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons. 28   Prime 
Minister Sato introduced this constraint in his Diet speech in 1967.  The principles of “no 
production” and “no possession” were consolidated by ratification of the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NTP) in 1976.  The third principle was arguably 
violated by the Japanese government’s permission to U.S. naval vessels with nuclear 
weapons to enter Japanese ports or to transit through Japanese ports.  
                                                 
25 Christopher W. Hughes, Ibid., 32.  
26 Joseph P. Keddell, Jr. The Politics of Defense in Japan, (New York : M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993), 32. 
27 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environment, (London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2004), 138.  
28 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Postwar Security Trajectory and Policy System, (London: 
Routledge, 2009), 34.  
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The fourth institutionalized resolution is the one percent of Gross 
National Product (GNP) limit on defense expenditure. 29   The Miki administration 
introduced this restriction in 1974.  From 1976 onward, defense expenditure was not 
allowed to exceed 1 percent of Japan’s GNP.  Except for one year when Nakasone 
Yasuhiro spent slightly above 1 percent of the GNP in 1986, this rule has been strictly 
kept.   
The fifth institutionalized resolution is the peaceful use of space.30  This 
resolution was passed by the Diet in May 1969.  It declared outer space would be used for 
peaceful purposes and any data would be interpreted and used for non-military activities.  
It constrained collection of military intelligence by satellite and possession of technology 
in space industries related to the area of arms manufacturing. 
 
Table 2.   Institutionalized security identity of domestic antimilitarism 
Defense Constraint Month / Year Prime Minister Related issue 
Ban on oversea dispatch July 1954 Shigeru Yoshida Passing the Defense Law 
Ban on arms export  April 1967 Eisaku Sato  Passing the Third Defense Plan 
Three non-nuclear principles December 1967 Eisaku Sato  Debate over the nuclear 
weapon 
One percent of GNP limit October 1976 Takeo Miki Détente, oil crisis 
Peaceful use of space May 1969 Eisaku Sato  U.S.-USSR space competition 
 
b. Germany  
Following Germany’s defeat in WWII, the German constitution, the Basic 
Law, was newly drafted.  Four allied powers agreed to rebuild Germany and guaranteed 
that the German people would live on a peaceful basis in order not to repeat the same 
mistakes made during the interwar period.  Unlike the case of Japan, elected German 
assemblies lived in the U.S. occupation zone and drafted the democratic constitution by 
themselves.  The Basic Law is firmly anchored in antimilitarism judging from several 
                                                 
29 Christopher W. Hughes, Ibid., 35. 
30 Christopher W. Hughes, Ibid., 35.  
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articles.  Overall, Article 87a (2) of the German Basic Law, restrains the use of the 
Bundeswehr for “national defense”; Article 24(1–2) leaves room for transferring 
sovereign rights to collective security institutions; and Article 26 forbids acts intended to 
disturb international peace.       
Article 24 reads as follows:31  
(1) The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to 
international organizations. 
(1 a) Insofar as the Länder are competent to exercise state powers and to 
perform state functions, they may, with the consent of the Federal 
Government, transfer sovereign powers to transfrontier institutions in 
neighboring regions. 
(2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a 
system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such 
limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a 
lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world. 
(3) For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation shall 
accede to agreements providing for general, comprehensive and 
compulsory international arbitration. 
Article 26 reads as follows:  
(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful 
relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, 
shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a criminal offence. 
(2) Weapons designed for warfare may be manufactured, transported or 
marketed only with the permission of the Federal Government. Details 
shall be regulated by a federal law. 
                                                 
31 German Bundestag, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, (Berlin: Public Relations 
Division, 2008) http://www.bundestag.de/interakt/infomat/ 
fremdsprachiges_material/downloads/ggEn_download.pdf (accessed July 31, 2009). 
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Article 87a (1), (2), (3), (4) reads as follows:  
(1) The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defense.  
Their numerical strength and general organizational structure must be 
shown in the budget. (newly added in 1950s) 
(2) Apart from defense, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the 
extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law.  
(3) During a state of defense or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall 
have the power to protect civilian property and to perform traffic control 
functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their defense mission. 
Moreover, during a state of defense or a state of tension, the Armed Forces 
may also be authorized to support police measures for the protection of 
civilian property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the 
competent authorities. 
(4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free 
democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, the Federal 
Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91 
obtain and the police forces and the Federal Border Police prove 
inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support the police and the 
Federal Border Police in protecting civilian property and in combating 
organized armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed Forces 
shall be discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands. 
In practicing security policies, Germany has imposed limits on the use of 
military forces based on the interpretation of the clauses above.  The interpretation of the 
Basic Law became far clearer since the Constitutional Court granted legal basis to the 
German Bundeswehr when participating in international military operations outside the 
NATO area once the majority of support in the Bundestag was given.32  Unlike Japan,  
 
 
                                                 
32 Craig R. Whitney, “Court Permits German Troops a Foreign Role,” New York Times, July 13, 1994.  
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Germany had no additional resolutions that were institutionalized in the form of law.  
Instead, it granted the Constitution the superior right to undertake a substantial role in 
coordinating and controlling the German military.   
4. Conclusion 
One of main themes that this thesis intends to deal with is the shifting security 
identity of domestic antimilitarism in Japan and Germany.  In the first place, when 
Japanese and German policy makers design security policies, the security identity of 
domestic antimilitarism provides a framework that circumscribes the scope of military 
roles and missions on the part of state activities.  Up to now, the security identity of 
domestic antimilitarism that emerged in the aftermath of WWII has been firmly 
institutionalized and implemented into Japan’s and Germany’s security policy making 
processes.  As well, consensus has existed; if policies deviated from the range of the 
public’s acceptance in line with the given framework, the public would challenge the 
policy. 33   Also, the implemented security identity of domestic antimilitarism exerts 
significant influences on security policymaking.   
However, there has come a time when the existing security identity of domestic 
antimilitarism has had to be modified or changed.  For research purposes, this thesis 
redefines the term of shifting security identity of domestic antimilitarism to an evolution 
of the interpretation of the existing security identity of domestic antimilitarism and which 
represents a departure from the existing guidance from the central tenets.  Oros presented 
three factors that contribute to changes in security policies:34 (1) “Ideas about appropriate 
action change, perhaps even so far as an identity shift;” (2) “Political power distribution 
or the party in power changes;” (3) “The context or environment in which policy is made 
or to which it is targeted changes.”  With the help of these three propositions, it can be 
stated that identity shift took place when “major policy change took place through the 
adoption of a new security identity.”35  Besides, the wholesale adoption of changes in 
                                                 
33 Oros, op. cit., 32.  
34 Oros, op. cit., 25. 
35 Oros, op. cit., 26.  
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security policies leads to identity shift and vice versa.  It is important to note that changes 
in the security environment (the security policy change case - 3) provide politicians with 
great motivation to shift or modify security policies.  If the change is enormous - e.g., an 
entire international system changes at the end of the two World Wars or the end of the 
Cold War, this could lead changes in security identity.  Moreover it was a role of party 
politics to translate external environmental changes into changes in security policy, then 
to changes in security identity; and then to adopt different sets of ideas in devising 
security policies to the extent of bringing a change in security identity.  In this sense, 
when it comes to discussing the topic of shifting security identity, not only the 
international security environment but also party politics and the public should be taken 
into account.   
The third tenet of Japan and Germany which found common context is concerned 
with reluctance to engage in wars taking place outside of their own territory.  In the case 
of Germany, even though its defense forces were under the command of a multinational 
security organization, practically, security policies in Germany had little interest with 
reference to calling collective security into effect.  In the case of Japan, at the outset of 
bilateral security, mutual military cooperation was out of bounds so long as the contents 
of the security treaty were concerned.  In spite of being under the bilateral security 
framework, Japanese assistance for the alliance partner was not put into practice.  
Moreover, both Japan and Germany barely resorted to the use of military forces unless 
there were direct threats or attacks on their own territory.   
However, from the beginning of the 1990s, the tenet was challenged to remain 
consistent with the past pattern of security practice.  As the hostile international security 
environment began to thaw, as the West-East German states unified, foreign nations as 
well as domestic politics reinterpreted the role of the military in foreign war.  The course 
of change in the third tenet was not simple but complex and demanding.  As security 
identity, defined by the third tenet, guided Japan’s and Germany’s security practices for 
long decades, the change came to the fore in difficulties.  From this standpoint, this thesis 
will focus on political parties’ positions and interactions when the long held tenet of 
security identity was challenged. 
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B. PARTY POLITICS 
1. Role of Political Parties 
Political parties are most significant figurehead of advanced democracy.  They 
represent interests of various social groups, run candidates for elections, and formulate 
public policies.  This chapter will explain what parties’ general roles are.  This 
examination will provide an understanding of parties’ interactions when security identity 
was challenged to be rewritten. 
a. Represents Public and Social Groups  
First of all, the main function of political parties in a democracy is to 
connect the people’s opinion with political platforms.  The role is revealed in various 
ways. Parties represent social groups and the people.  Most all democratic countries’ 
parties’ cleavages represent social cleavages.  By looking at social groups’ and the 
public’s needs they integrate various opinions into the national agenda.  However, 
political parties cannot represent all parts of social groups, electorates or constituents.36  
Thus, in modern society, sometimes parties have been created or dissolved by the will of 
the electorate who want their special interests to be reflected in a national agenda.    
Second, political parties fulfill the function of opinion formation.  As 
societies become more complex, the representation of a single public opinion or one 
group’s interests becomes far more difficult.  In return, political parties play a more 
important role in contemporary society.  That is because they have to form opinions and 
produce policies that can garner support from the electorates.  Special groups which have 
influential power in the society, with a lot of resources of money or manpower, are not 
able to represent a party’s agendas alone.  Political parties have to listen to the voices of 
isolated classes in the society and reflect their opinions in national policies as well.  
Third, political parties are mediators that reconcile different interests.  In 
the process of opinion forming, parties collect different opinions from different 
individuals and put those diverse opinions into a compromised agenda.  This function 
                                                 
36 Richard S. Katz, “Party in Democratic Theory,” in Handbook of Party Politics, eds. Richard S. Katz 
and William Crotty (London: Sage Publications, 2006): 33–44.  
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balances different interests and leads to the final decision not to take extreme positions.37  
This function also has a negative aspect.  In the process of reconciling different interests, 
political parties can lean toward majority opinions, so opinions from minorities can 
become buried.  Thus, sometimes minorities create their own parties to convey their 
opinions to the public agenda.38   
Fourth, political parties function as a route to allow individuals to become 
part of political platforms.  In a democracy, every individual has the right to have access 
to political parties.  A political party itself is an excellent pathway for people to express 
their own opinions and interests in a direct way.  In converse, political parties select party 
members who can gain support from a large number of people.  Likewise, parties provide 
individuals with opportunities to enter into a formal organizational apparatus and 
facilitate individuals’ participations.     
Nowadays political parties also take responsibility for forming opinions in 
a certain direction.  As more diverse opinions exist in a society, parties’ roles of 
reconciling different interests and incorporating opinions into compromise policy 
packages becomes more important.  In security policy making in Japan and Germany, 
public opinion was more important than in any other country, since parties were not free 
from the public’s deep sense of aversion to the military and to war.  Thus, when it comes 
to studying the evolution of security identities of domestic antimilitarism in Japan and 
Germany, political parties’ roles in representing public opinion is an important factor to 
consider.   
b. Policy Makers  
Parties are groups of individuals who have shared ideologies and 
prioritized values and whose role is to create policies which enable the promotion of 
national interests.  Parties’ specific policy ideas originated from the parties’ ideologies.  
                                                 
37 Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, and Scott E. Page, “Political Parties and Electoral Landscapes,” 
British Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (January 1998): 147–151.   
38 Miki C. Kittilson and Tate, Katherine, “Political Parties, Minorities and elected Office: Comparing 
Opportunities for Inclusion, in the U.S. and Britain,” Center for the Study of Democracy, (March, 2004): 1–
22.  
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As Lipset and Rokkan noted, policy is “packaged by ideology.” 39   At most, party 
platforms, manifestoes, and programs carry parties’ ideologies, policy goals and 
proposals.40  Parties’ ideologies are a core means to ensure parties’ policy to be cohesive.  
The cohesiveness of policies makes electorates give constant support or opposition to the 
parties.  In return, parties can have an opportunity to attract more voters by appealing to 
their responsibilities and reliability to behave based on their principles in a cohesive 
manner.41  It is true that parties’ respective policies are changed over time.42  Parties have 
to respond to changing situations in a society.  Moreover, responses to changing 
situations and reforms are one important source of parties’ appeal to voters.  However, 
when it comes to considering core principles inside policy packages, the principles tend 
to be consistent.  Even if parties change their names and organizational structures, most 
party manifestoes continue to have the same general ideological principles over time.43  
That is because parties making policies under changing circumstances are not free from 
ideological identity.  Variation of policies is also circumscribed through the parties’ 
ideological principles that have been maintained over time.  If this is not the case, then 
parties have to rewrite their identities and would lose party reliability.   
On the contrary, there is another argument to explain parties’ motivation 
to make policies.   This view highlights the fact that parties are primarily motivated to 
make policies to win elections.44  This argument depicts parties’ role as an office seeker 
who bases behavior on electoral appeal.  For this school of thought, political ideologies 
are tools to gain more supporters than opponents and ideas and ideologies are chosen for 
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a maximum share of the popular vote.  Considering parties’ roles in democracy to 
represent public opinion, to be a way to express public opinion in political institutions, 
and to form and reconcile different opinions and interests, office seeking is an important 
motivation.  However, even if the parties’ ideology functions only as a means to attract 
voters’ attention, it is an undeniable fact that a constant set of policy ideas and ideology is 
one of the important factors for parties to win elections.  As discussed above, consistent 
party behaviors before and after election campaigns convince voters of the parties’ 
reliability and responsibility.  Moreover, in a complex society, diverse interests exist. In 
order to respond to shifts in the voters preferences, parties have to adjust policy stances 
frequently, which might lead to losing credibility and losing electorates’ support.  In this 
regard, parties’ ideologies and constant implementation of policy ideas should not be 
underestimated.  
For research purposes, it is important to measure parties’ motivations in 
security policy making whether primarily moved by policy seekers’ arguments or office 
seekers’ arguments.  This thesis will follow the policy seekers’ arguments that put much 
importance on ideology and principles when security policy making is concerned.    That 
is because public opinion on security matters is not built on the public’s core interests in 
their individual lives.  Rather, public opinion about security policies is constructed 
throughout a culture and history.  This view comes from ideologies and preferred views 
on international relations rather than directly related day-to-day-basis interests.  Unless 
people feel threatened by external enemies when public opinion is shaped by top 
priorities, public opinion on security matters is resilient to change.  Thus it is important to 
focus on parties’ basic principles and ideologies rather their intentions to win elections 
when appealing to voters in parties’ security policy making process.   
Given that parties’ ideological principles make the parties’ policy 
platforms consistent for significant periods of time, parties’ influence on making policies 
in the parliamentary system is another important subject.  Before further discussion, note 
that this thesis assumes that parties are unitary actors.  It does not see party members’ 
personal differences over the party’s policy platform and assumes that every party 
member votes the party line in parliament.   
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Parties play an important role in policy choice in the parliament once a 
government bill is handed down to the legislative body.  At this stage, minor parties can 
leverage their policy stances.  A debate of this kind is important for a well-functioning 
and advanced democracy. 45  Parties are the central component of the debate process 
through which final decisions are made.  Parties suggest and promote feedback between 
parliamentary activity and public opinion.  In security policy areas, debate heightens 
when the disagreement between governing parties and opposition parties is great.  In 
general debate in the parliament scarcely leads to a direct change in government policy; 
nevertheless, it can exert pressure which at times calls for referenda on a government’s 
security policy. 46   Sometimes, one point of leverage is the so-called delay tactic.  
Opposition parties reject passing a bill during the parliamentary sessions by boycotting.  
In addition, they propose amended bills and then insist on voting on them.  A series of 
opposition parties’ actions can be time-consuming and prevent quick and effective 
decision making.  However, there is no doubt that the delaying tactic is one method to 
exert influence on policy choices in the parliament. 
c. Competitors over the Preferred Policy  
Another important role of a political party is to compete with opponents in 
the decision making process.  Party competition is a core part of a well-developed 
democracy.47  There are two explanations about political competition.  The first interprets 
the parties’ competition as they compete with each other for alignment with more 
supporters’ interests and opinions.  Party competition facilitates a party’s credibility by 
satisfying the citizens’ interests in politics.   Voters vote for candidates who are willing to 
listen to their ideas and interests and transfer them through the decision making system.  
The other explanation argues that parties compete with each other for policy outcomes.  
According to this point of view, the power of a party is measured by policy outcomes that 
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follow a party’s beliefs and principles.   Moreover, parties try to win elections in order to 
accomplish policy goals rather than make policies to win elections.  This perspective sees 
that parties’ fulfillment of policy goals is the best way to attract voters.   
Parties’ competition can be examined without consideration of voters’ 
tendencies when voting and parties respond to voting behavior.  In this regard, parties’ 
competition is typically described by a theory of “vote-maximizing behavior.”48 Some 
voters have non-policy considerations in their decision making in elections. By contrast, 
some voters have more ability to discern parties’ or candidates’ willingness concerning 
policy impositions throughout the policy making process.  Some citizens do not want to 
vote at all.  In order to garner as much support as possible, parties have to analyze voters’ 
behavior patterns.  One thing worthwhile focusing on is the fact that the parties’ 
credibility is derived from the party’s ability to bow to the voters’ expectations and align 
with them regardless of the voters behavior patterns.  Thus, one critical condition for 
parties to have power and influence in politics is to design appealing policy packages and 
to redeem pledges in real politics and to accumulate accountability to voters.   
However, there are other ways to gain power in politics having few votes, 
in particular in a parliamentary system.  One possible way is to make coalitions to form a 
government.  Where votes are distributed too widely to have one dominant major party, 
this coalition forming is a prevalent method to make a government more stabilized and 
powerful.49  This method also enables small parties to influence national-level politics 
and the decision making process.   Another way to exert power in politics on minor 
parties’ side is to make a use of systemic advantages. Minor parties can be united to 
boycott to voting for policies in parliament or to encourage greater public opinion to 
oppose major parties’ policies.   The minor parties could gain more power when major 
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parties increasingly fail to deal appropriately with the wide range of views and interests 
that political dynamic at national, regional and local levels consists of.50    
Likewise, political parties’ important roles are to compete with each other 
for power.  This is the basic motivation to make efforts to gain support from voters.  
Political parties’ power facilitates implementation of policies as well.  In the realm of 
security policy making, parties compete with each other to accomplish their policy goals.  
In a situation when public opinion is centrist, parties’ competition is revealed.  They 
compete to impose their own values and ideologies on the final policy outcomes.  When 
discussing the agenda of forming a different security identity in a parliament, party 
competition plays a crucial role in maintaining consistency with the previous scope of 
domestic antimilitarism.   
2. Determinants of a Security Policy Stance  
This thesis assumes three things.  First, in security policy making, parties are 
primarily guided by their ideology rather than electoral motivations.  Second, it assumes 
that the parties’ principal ideology remains unchanged from the time of foundation.  
Third, it assumes a party is one entity rather than group of independent individuals 
aiming to win competition with opponents.  But, measuring party positions with specific 
variables remains a difficult exercise.  Most well-known ideological classification 
methods place parties on the left-right dimension.  In general, left of the ideological 
spectrum stands for progressive politics, whereas right of the ideological spectrum stands 
for conservative politics.  In particular, left parties advocate for communist or socialist 
development models, whereas right parties advocate for capitalist developmental 
models.51  Additionally, “individual freedom,” “human liberties,” and “free enterprise” 
belong to the right parties’ positions, whereas “social warfare,” “reformed capitalism for 
                                                 
50 Colin Copus, Alistair Clark, Herwig Reynaeft and Krstof Steyvers, “Minor Party and Independent 
Politics Beyond the Mainstream: Fluctuating Fortunes but a Permanent Presence,” Parliamentary Affairs 
62, no. 1 (2009): 4–18.  
51 Ronald D. Kambert, James E. Curtis, Steven D. Brown, and Barry J. Kay, “In Search of Left/Right 
Belief in the Canadian Electorate,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 19, no 3 (September 1986): 542. 
 30
disposed group” belong to the left parties’ positions.52  Yet, not only domestic issues, but 
also abstract values and beliefs are involved in the left-right typology.  Thus, this 
characterization does not directly translate into a party’s classification according to 
security policy preference.  In this regard, this thesis puts forward three variables to 
measure parties’ differences in security policy positions.  One is the parties’ preferences 
with respect to national identities, another is the parties’ positions on favored 
international relations, and the last is the parties’ positions on military roles. 
Each party’s preference in security policy areas is related to the party’s preferred 
view on national identity.  In the period of national foundation, the parties of Japan and 
Germany had different views about what national identity would be plausible to follow in 
the future.  Also, parties which were created far after the national building period also 
have views they prioritize of the desirable character of the nation.  By definition, a nation 
is a “named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duty 
for all members.”53   Since the definition of nation is complex and abstract, the definition 
of national identity is certainly multi-dimensional.  Hence, the concept of national 
identity entails not only how a national identity can be combined with other kinds of 
identity—class, religious or ethnic—but also how ideologies exert influence on shaping 
national identity.54  This thesis only focuses on one dimension of national identity, to 
define the character of a nation as a whole.  Specifically, national identities of Japan and 
Germany are defined as what kinds of counties Japan and Germany are and what roles 
they are playing in an international context. 
It is true that national identity is not formulated within a small span of time, but 
for Japan and Germany, the postwar period was a special time to rewrite their nations’ 
constitutions, rooted in antimilitaristic approaches.  Japan’s and Germany’s politicians 
raised questions about what future Japanese and German national identities were 
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plausible to formulate in the immediate postwar period.  The national identity each party 
presented was different from one party to another.  The differences and rationales give an 
opportunity to trace fundamental values and principles each party perceived and primary 
ground for guiding selecting security policy options. 
Each party’s preferred view on security policies is also measured by its positions 
on a diverse realm of issues related to national security.  Among various issues, parties’ 
approaches to international relations shaped the fundamental grounds of parties’ security 
policy stances.  In the case of Japan, some parties prefer aligning with the United States 
whereas some parties preferred aligning with regional nations or preferred remaining 
neutral in international politics.  In the case of Germany, some parties preferred 
integrating with western European nations whereas some parties preferred rapprochement 
with Eastern European nations.  The different views of international relations resulted in 
parties’ different approaches to secure the nation against external threats. 
In addition, parties have their own positions related to military roles.  The 
discussion of military roles earnestly emerged in the post-Cold War period, when Japan 
and Germany were able to gain economic power and good reputations from international 
communities.  Exercising a full array of military roles was a major source when it came 
to normalization of their national stature.  However, parties’ views diverged on the issues.  
There were also parties in Japan and Germany which took cautious positions on active 
military interventions in international security affairs.  Rather, they preferred integrating 
their military into multilateral security organizations.  Different positions with respect to 
military roles caused parties to take different security policy paths.  In this regard, 
military roles can be a variable to measure the parties’ security stances. 
An examination of security policy stance is of significance since it makes one 
nation’s security policy predictable and accountable to some extent.  In the use of force in 
foreign war discussion, this security policy stance made a great impact on writing the 
security policy package for each party.  When parties choose their policies on some 




rationale to oppose or suppose the security policy agenda originated from their own 
security policy preferences.  This argument will be proved by analyzing Japan’s and 
Germany’s war participation discussions.  
3. The Role of Political Parties in the Evolution of the Security Identity 
of Domestic Antimilitarism    
Codification of security identity has much to do with political negotiations.  When 
tracing back the process of the emergence of security identity of domestic antimilitarism 
in postwar Japan and Germany, it is worth noting that there were contestations among 
those who supplied different sets of ideas for new security identities.  In the process of 
political negotiations for a new security identity, political parties played the main roles in 
furnishing coherent and unique views based on their preferred principles.  Another point 
is that there was no total winner or no total loser in the security identity-seeking 
contestation.  In other words, Japanese and German security identity of domestic 
antimilitarism was not forged by a single dominant party’s voice.  Instead it was a final 
result of political negotiations with several political parties which reorganized after the 
end of WWII.55  Compromises created the hegemonic security identity of postwar Japan 
and Germany known as the security identity of domestic antimilitarism.   
Then, how did parties bring about changes in the security identity of domestic 
antimilitarism? As mentioned earlier, political parties are identified based on their 
ideological stance.  Namely, each party has a tendency to cling to its original policy 
stance.  Both Japan and Germany shared a common fundamental value of antimilitarism 
when designing security policies.  However, political parties’ policy positions are 
difficult to be retained constantly.  There are two main reasons.  First of all, a new 
security environment requires each party to adjust its identity on security agendas in 
response to circumstantial alterations.  Reunification of the two German states and the 
end of the Cold War were representative cases calling for adjustment of the future 
national identity of each party as well as the way to pursue national interests.  Second, 
external pressures either on bilateral dimensions or on multilateral dimensions require 
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parties to make changes in their policy line that deviate substantially from the original 
ideological foundations.  For example, the memories in the first Gulf War let Japan and 
Germany “do something” to keep international peace.  On facing the transition of the 
environment, as well as the imposition of foreign pressures, political parties of Japan and 
Germany were forced out, as Hinich suggested, relying on issue-based pledges or 
manifestos rather than ideological-based ones for winning elections.56   
However, although a tendency of issue-based policy making prevails over time, in 
the cases of Japanese and German policy, choices on “use of forces” were contained 
within a frame of the existing security identity.  That was because a “bottom line” that 
upheld Japan’s and Germany’s antimilitarism was the reluctance to use military forces.  
However, considering a definition of militarism as a use of military means in order to 
achieve national purpose, the use of forces in foreign territory aroused war trauma which 
still remained in the Japanese and German people’s minds.57  For this reason, political 
parties in Japan and Germany had to make new paradigms to deal both with external 
challenges (or requests) and internal antimilitaristic identities.  
Political parties’ role in policy making about “use of force” manifests in three 
dimensions.  First, considering the nature of the parliamentary system in both countries, 
political parties’ policy preferences had impacts on drafting and designing new sets of 
policies.  Namely, facing needs to respond to security environment alteration, political 
parties took leading roles in lawmaking and passing bills in both parliaments.  Second, 
political parties accommodate public opinion.  It is a main function of political parties to 
represent the people in a democratic political system.58  Therefore, before putting an issue 
of deployment of military force in foreign areas on the negotiation table, political parties 
of Japan and Germany, at first, had to consider the antimilitaristic sentiments of the 
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population since the war ended.  Third, another noteworthy role of political parties is to 
provide checks and balances of different preferences and ways of approaching the “use of 
force” agenda.  Japan and Germany both are under the parliamentary system which has 
two main competing parties with different ideas and values.  Thus, political parties, in 
parliament, debated the draft bill which articulated how to deploy military forces and the 
legitimacy of the military operation. 
How, then, does the security identity of domestic antimilitarism have an effect on 
the process of political parties’ policy making?  In every dimension stated above, the 
sources of antimilitarism intervene.  Above all, the constitutions of both countries 
provide a legal base for special bills in the legislative process.  Japan’s and Germany’s 
constitutions articulate restrictions in that use of force is not excusable for any reason (in 
the case of Japan);59 or in that use of force is justifiable only under the command of 
mutual collective security in order to maintain peace (in the case of Germany).  Next, 
public opinions in Japan and Germany are core sources of restriction against use of force 
in foreign areas.  The antimilitaristic ethos that has grown up in the minds of the German 
population since the war ended was still strong enough to put the agenda through harsh 
debate.  It is true that public opinions has been changing over time and diverging over 
different acceptable levels (about environmental changes) and different views on how to 
interpret new government policies.  In addition, political parties’ policies can obtain more 
legitimacy when representing as many peoples’ opinions as possible. 60   Thus, when 
political parties discuss the “use of force” agenda in the parliament, public opinion is an 
important theme of concern.  Lastly, political parties’ policy stances exerted significant 
influence on the decision making as well as the debate process.  As shown, from the 
beginning of their organizations, Japanese and German parties have been bound to 
antimilitarism.  Although each specific policy package, such as alliance politics,  
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constitutional revision, and priorities between integration and reunification differed 
substantially from each other, all parties had been very cautious about the decision 
making process on the subject of the use of force.  
 36
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III. CASE STUDY OF GERMANY: THE BOSNIAN WAR AND 
EVOLUTION OF GERMAN SECURITY IDENTITY 
A. SHAPING CONDITIONS FOR NEW SECURITY PRACTICES 
1. New Security Environment 
Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the two German states and four 
occupying states finally concluded the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to 
Germany,” the so called “two plus four agreement,” on September 12, 1990.61  Through 
consensus across the East-West blocs, East and West Germany unified under the existing 
constitution of West Germany (on October 3, 1990); at the same time, a united Germany 
gained full sovereignty over its domestic and foreign affairs.  By virtue of the 
reunification, Germany was distanced from direct territorial threat.  Indeed, during the 
Cold War, West Germany had feared that its use of military forces for any reason could 
motivate East Germany or the Soviet Union to take military action in response. 62  
Regardless of type of international military operation (from peacekeeping operations to 
full-scale war), the German Bundeswehr was excluded from participating militarily in 
operations in non-NATO foreign areas.  However, in the absence of direct threat, German 
politicians could afford to pay attentions to diverse policy variants in security areas.    
Just as German unification had been realized, the Soviet Union disintegrated into 
several successor nation states and subsequently, the Cold War ended.  Also, the end of 
the Cold War gave rise to dramatic increases in the use of military forces in conflicts 
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under international auspices such as the U.N. or NATO.63  The Gulf War of 1990-1991 
was a momentous test of the U.N.’s collective security system.64  The test presented by 
the Gulf War had considerable implications for a shift in the way in which international 
peace and stability had been maintained.  The end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
war in the Persian Gulf (1990–1991) were important to proving the effectiveness of 
multinational coalition forces under the international security organization’s mandate. 
These led to a watershed in shifting people’s focus regarding the use of force to different 
dimension.  In the Cold War period, arms races or arms controls were used to deter war 
and to preserve peace and stability, but afterward, military cooperation was used to carry 
out the same functions.  Therefore, German politicians began to reconsider their security 
identity of “no use of force in foreign war.”  The unexpected international burden sharing 
criticism against German financial contributions without troop commitment in the Gulf 
War further stimulated shaping the conditions to reframe for Germany’s security 
identity.65 
Germany was exposed to a new security environment through peaceful 
reunification, and the end of the Cold War.  Thanks to reunification, Germany was 
emancipated from direct territorial threats.  Thus, it could afford to pay attention to 
broader ranges of military contribution without worrying about its enemies’ responses.  
Moreover, the end of the Cold War laid down basic ground rules where multinational 
coalition operations were taken for granted to preserve peace and stability.  With lessons 
learned from the Gulf War, Germany realized the important fact that standing aside from 
international conflict was no longer a best decision in the changed security environment.  
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Henceforth, Germany showed greater acceptance of taking more international 
responsibility with military forces.  It decided to deploy the first large Bundeswehr field 
unit to Somalia for peacekeeping operations (UNOSOM II) in 1993–1994.66 
2. The Rise of Tension in the Balkans 
In the absence of Soviet leadership, the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
was disposed to widespread nationalism and the rise of authoritarianism in Serbia.67  The 
final dissolution of Yugoslavia formally occurred when independence of the Catholic 
contingent, Croatia and Slovenia, was recognized by the European Union on January 15, 
1992.68  A serious conflict arose when the multi-ethnic contingent, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(hereafter referred to as Bosnia), declared independence on March 5, 1992 as a result of 
the referendum on independence which accounted for 99.7 % of voters in the Bosnian 
constituent agreement.69  From the beginning of the independence declaration by Croatia 
and Bosnia, rising tension in Balkans erupted into military clashes that swept across 
Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 until the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement ended the civil 
war.  The rise of Serbian nationalism had great effects on Europe’s entire security 
topography where, until then, European nations had remained stable after the long bipolar 
peace of the Cold War.70  European nations had tragic memories of nationalism, in 
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retrospect of the Holocaust during WWII.  Moreover, Sarajevo, now the capital of Bosnia, 
was the place where a roar of gunfire had announced that WWI was beginning.  
The Balkans’ unrest aroused concerns of German leaders, since the Balkans were 
so close to Germany.  The southern part of Germany had strong ties with the Dalmatian 
coast of Croatia in aspects of culture, history, and religion.71  Many Germans enjoyed 
vacations along the Croatian coast.  The geographic proximity created a hostile 
environment under which Germany probably underwent an indirect or, even, a direct 
impact of war.  Above all, German politicians perceived an unpleasant entrapment 
situations considering the numbers of Croatian guest workers at over 400,000 who 
worked in German companies.72  Furthermore, according to a 1992 report of a U.N. 
agency, Germany was the largest recipient of war refugees from the former Yugoslavia 
with 200,000. 73   Also, the occurrence of human rights violations in the form of 
indiscriminate attacks and genocide either on armed forces or on civilians drew German 
peace activists’ attention.74  Consequently, a likelihood of the reoccurrence of war on the 
European continent, as well as human rights violations, paved the way for German 
politicians to consider a wider range of Bundeswehr operation beyond traditional Article 
VI NATO territory.   
German security practice before the Bosnian War demonstrated that all war 
participation, regardless of territorial boundaries, was inconceivable, although based on 
Article 24 of the German Basic Law, German participation in collective security under 
the U.N. mandate was permissable as far as constitutionality was concerned.  However, 
the political crisis engenered by the collapse of the Yugoslav Republic shaped conditions 
calling for revision of the German security identity concerning the ban on “out of area 
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military operations.”  The rise of tension in the vicinity of German territory and human 
rights violations encouraged the Germans to consider contributing to the war in Bosnia to 
preserve peace and stability on European soil.  Eventually, the situation offered catalytic 
momentum for a challenge to Germany’s basic tenet of security identity of domestic 
antimilitarism, “no use of force in foreign war.”   
3. Foreign Expectations  
The international response at the outset of war showed reluctance to engage. 
Contrary to the case of the Gulf War, it was not easy to mobilize multinational military 
forces mandated by the U.N. because of Russia’s ethnic affiliation with Slavs.  Instead, 
engagements of international security organizations were designed on a case-by-case 
basis.  As well, in the absence of a U.N. mandate, NATO carried out limited missions 
which were under U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) authorization.  
The U.N. raised sanctions and deployed United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) for war-monitoring, provided humanitarian aid to refugees, and protected 
refugees and civilians against indiscriminate attacks.  The U.N. did not take sides, but 
supervised the war so that it would not encroach on non-military personnel.  In May 1992, 
the U.N. imposed economic sanctions on the former Yugoslavia.  Along with the 
economic sanctions, a naval blockade of Serbia and Montenegro was launched as another 
form of U.N. sanctions in November 1992.  As well, beginning in May 1992, 
UNPROFOR was deployed to Sarajevo to take on the responsibility of keeping the 
airport open. Despite its second-hand assistance, away from the front lines, UNPROFOR 
was victimized by war as Serbian forces held them hostage and attacks swept across all 
regions indiscriminately.75 
Under the auspices of UNSCR, NATO’s engagement in the Bosnian War began.76  
At the same time, a high degree of foreign expectations of NATO and the allies came out 
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officially.  The following table demonstrates the European nations’ operations during the 
four years of the Bosnian War which at the same time called for German solidarity.77   
 
Table 3.   European Nations’ Contributions to the Bosnian War (After: Dayson, 
2007, 195) 
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NATO carried out essential roles in the Bosnia War with various forms of 
operations from monitoring the no-fly zone to air strikes and peace enforcement.  
Repercussions to Germany from those NATO participations were substantial.  During the 
entire period of the war in Bosnia, Germany faced high expectations from NATO’s allies 
to take on more responsibility in the international conflict.  At every moment of 
launching NATO operations, Germany was not an exception as a participant.  For 
UNPROFOR operations, Germany was required by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali to give logistical support on July 6, 1992.78  Subsequently, on July 15, 1992, 
Germany was ordered to send naval forces to monitor the naval embargo in the Adriatic 
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Sea as ordered by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.79  When NATO officials 
needed to enforce the flight ban over Bosnian air space, special attention turned toward 
Germany’s air combat potential which consisted of one fourth of the surveillance planes 
suitable for reconnaissance, radar suppression, and optimal low-level attack.80  NATO 
made it clear that “in the absence of the German help, there would be a significant impact 
on the operational capability of the AWACS,” which could afford to take on critical tasks 
from detecting violations to guiding NATO combat aircraft to their targets.81   
Moreover, in the winter of 1994, when the NATO air strike plan was drawn up, 
NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), General George Joulwan, called on 
German assistance of ECR-Tornado aircraft in support of the NATO operations because 
of Germany’s high-level air-combat capabilities.  Germany also was required to show 
solidarity by making military contributions.  Finally, in the IFOR and SFOR cases, 
foreign expectations were not as intense as the previous times since Germany had 
committed to support peace enforcement operations in the summer of 1995.   
In sum, down through the years of the war of Yugoslav succession, Germany met 
with high expectations from foreign nations, in particular from NATO allies.  Allies’ 
demands became more vocal as time passed.  German politicians rushed into harsh debate, 
not just because the war occurred outside of NATO territory, but because in the absence 
of prior experience, there were no criteria to bring consensus across parties.  Demands for 
German participation evolved from limited requests for logistical help with peacekeeping 
operations or monitoring the embargo to directing air strikes and rapid reaction forces.  
As long as a matter of “no precedents” was concerned, it is important to know how 
consensus was reached across party lines without a new framework on the issues.    
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B. PARTY AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PUBLIC  
One of the important roles of a political party is to represent the people and 
integrate the people’s opinions with a national agenda.  Thus, an examination of public 
opinion on the Bundeswehr’s out of area missions is warranted when discussing the 
evolving process of the German security identity.   
In the context of public support for out-of-area missions, respondents were asked 
two questions concerning Bundeswehr engagement and NATO engagement in out-of-
area missions on a general level.  In the context of public opinion concerning the Bosnian 
War, three questions were raised–(1) military enforcement of the U.N.-imposed no-fly 
zone over Bosnia, (2) the RRF plan, and (3) the bombing of Serb troops. 82    
 
Table 4.   Support for out-of-area missions and the Bosnian War (After: Juhasz, 
2001, 74) 
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The results revealed different overall patterns of attitudes between East-West 
citizens.  Those with Eastern origins were less inclined to give support for military 
interventions.  For the subject of deployment of military forces outside NATO territory, a 
low rate of approval was detected from both East and West respondents in comparison 
with the specific case of the Bosnian War questions.  The results also suggest that a 
skeptical attitude toward out-of-area missions appeared toward both the Bundeswehr and 
NATO engagements.  The majority of Germans still thought that not only the 
Bundeswehr, but also NATO, should be kept from out-of-area missions.  Meanwhile, 
faced with questions about specific operations in the Bosnian War, a trend was found that 
relatively limited and less harmful operations received higher degrees of acceptance.  In 
the “no-fly zone” question, over half of the Germans polled agreed to join.  By contrast, 
the numbers in favor of the RRF and bombardments decreased.    
Two other focal points were the Germans’ awareness of the shifting paradigm of 
military operations and their adoption of more international responsibility on the basis of 
that awareness.  As mentioned before, from the early 1990s, military operations began to 
be perceived as a core way of preserving peace and stability in Europe.  The Gulf War 
consolidated the conviction more.  The following survey described the trend of the 
German public’s attitude toward military and non-military missions from 1991 to 1993.83 
 
Table 5.   German Attitudes Toward Military and Nonmilitary Missions (After: 















1991 89% 59% 58% 52%  18% 
1992 93% 62% 53% 55% 28% 20% 
1993 95% 54% 53% 46% 32% 23% 
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For three years, it was clear that an overwhelming majority came to be in favor of 
humanitarian-aid missions.  Economic sanctions and peacekeeping operations were also 
favorable ways of taking international responsibilities for over the half of German public.  
A trend of opinion on military intervention through NATO and the U.N. had a similar 
pattern to the earlier survey, (see Table 5) in that questions about military interventions 
received a high level of opposition.  This trend was further confirmed by a different poll 
asking the respondents’ views on specific types of Bundeswehr participation between 
U.N. humanitarian missions and combat operations when German interests were at stake.  
While only one third of total respondents supported participation in combat operations 
when German interests were at stake, one half of the total supported the Bundeswehr’s 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. 84   The findings implied that whereas 
humanitarian aid had attracted much of the public’s attentions, humanitarian aid with 
military forces were still considered cautiously by the German public.  
In sum, during the time when the Bosnian War swept south Eastern Europe, it was 
evident that Germans were still reluctant to have German military forces engage in the 
war.  The key findings from the surveys were the public’s attitude toward humanitarian 
aid.  Although Germans in the early 1990s had inherited an aversion to the use of military 
forces from past history, the shifting paradigm of military operations for the purpose of 
humanitarian aid was a catalyst for turning the German people’s focus to military 
intervention of a different kind.  In fact, during the war, a trend of public opinion started 
changing due to large-scale genocide and human right violations.  Human rights 
violations were one of the most essential accelerators for shaping favorable conditions for 
Germans to accept military contributions beyond NATO’s territorial border.  For German 
politicians, being well aware of this public attitude was important to making policy for a 
new security identity and presenting acceptable criteria for military participation to a 
majority of the German people.  In the early 1990s, public support for military 
intervention and humanitarian aid collided to some degree.  However, considering the 
nature of the war in Bosnia, which had generated many indiscriminate attacks on civilians 
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and U.N. peacekeepers, genocides, and rapes, German politicians were allowed more 
room to persuade the public to accept their changed security practice.   
C. PARTY AS POLICY MAKER: POLICY ORIENTATIONS AND 
PARTIES’ BASIC SECURITY POLICY STANCES  
1. Brief Explanation  
Federal German parties, except for recently founded parties such as the Greens, 
reorganized after the war ended in 1945.  Most of the West German parties in the 
immediate postwar period had been forced to dissolve by the Nazis’ “Enabling Act” in 
1933.  Thus, the parties that emerged in 1946 in the western zones had a strong sense of 
anti-Nazism due to their memory of purges; as a result, they had actively tried to liquidate 
their wartime legacy of militarism.85  Divided Germany also experienced occupation 
authority during the interim period while the nation was stabilized from wartime memory 
that more or less lasted until 1955.  The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) stood as two main opposed parties as smaller 
parties grouped around them in what after 1949 was West Germany. 
Basically, federal German parties’ divisions on security issues were formed over 
European integration and reunification.86  As well, disagreement on the Bundeswehr’s 
size and scope of missions (out of area missions) constituted an important pillar in 
defining a party’s stance on security issues.87  As Prime Minister Yoshida contributed to 
constructing a new Japanese national identity including U.S.-Japan security relations in 
the postwar years, it was Konrad Adenauer (1949–1963) who took the same 
responsibility in terms of reconstructing national identity via integration in the West 
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through a policy of military contribution through NATO.88   This section will begin with 
reviewing Adenauer’s initiatives, focusing on national security issues, and assumes that 
his initiatives reflect the CDU’s ideology and security policy stance.  Next, it will deal 
with a counterpart’s (SPD) ideas and critics of Adenauer which reflect a different stance 
in the realm of security policy.  In particular, this section discusses continuity and 
transformation of party ideology and security policy preferences before and after the 
reunification in 1990.  
2. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU)  
Germany’s defeat in WWII laid the ground for favoring regional or 
internationally based integration in the minds of certain West German politicians.  
Adenauer intended to translate deep regret for wartime misdeeds into the willingness to 
accept the idea of transnational idealism of western integration.  He envisioned “civilian 
powers integrated into west Europe” as a basic idea for national initiatives. 89   The 
approach of “civilian powers” stood for a strong will not to return to previous militarism.  
The main feature of “civilian power” was to “contribute to building an international order 
that rests on norms and values rather than military might.”90  Besides, “integration into 
west Europe” stood for institutionalized means to prevent European countries from going 
to war.  The following will present the CDU’s basic stance on security policy.  
The first notable stance of the CDU’s security policy was to open a path to 
rearmament for West Germany for the purpose of military contributions to consolidating 
peace on European soil.  In Adenauer’s views, rearmament had three advantages for 
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national security. 91  First, rearmament was a basis for equal partnership with members of 
the West European community.  Second, it had implications for West Germany regaining 
authority to control domestic and foreign affairs.  Third and most importantly, 
rearmament showed political will toward solidarity with West European integration 
programs and their alliance system.   
The second stance to note was the NATO-centric security policy focus.  After 
West Germany was accepted in NATO, it was officially given military alliance status in 
1955.  Joining NATO was a critical way of improving national security against a Soviet 
threat and a rearmed East Germany.92  The organization was a way to guarantee West 
German security by means of integration and cooperation.  As well, it functioned as a 
good institutional barrier to deter a breakout of war in West German territory.  West 
Germany’s entry into NATO symbolically showed German solidarity with the alliance.  
However, there were disadvantages to entering the NATO system, since West Germany 
had to yield a part of its national sovereignty to a supra-national institution.93  It is true 
that West German rearmament was not linked to a restoration of its right to use military 
for national sovereignty or expansionary strategies.  But the West German entry into 
NATO was accepted under limited conditions that conceded national sovereignty to some 
degree.  First and foremost, West Germany renounced any right to produce atomic, 
biological, and chemical weapons.  Second, Germany admitted the U.S. military presence 
and bore some of the direct costs of same from the 1960s onward.  Third, the use of the 
Bundeswehr was only permissible under NATO military command or for self-defense 
purposes.94  
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The third stance was that the CDU preferred maintaining security ties with the 
United States, including its military presence on West German soil.95  Beginning in the 
1950s, further American troops and weapons were sent to Germany, including nuclear 
weapons.  For the 45 years in which Germany was divided, U.S. military troops and 
weapons were added or reduced along with the relationship between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.  The U.S. military troops stationed in Germany were the backbone 
of the U.S. commitment to military engagements for protecting Europe and laying down 
peace and security in Europe during the Cold War.   For the German position, the U.S. 
presence also had symbolically showed the German intention to maintain a friendly 
relationship with the United States.  
Adenauer’s views and his achievements from the immediate postwar period 
shaped what the CDU thought appropriate courses of action of the nation, where the 
wounds of war still existed in the population.  The CDU put more emphasis on 
integration than reunification, in contrast to the SPD and other small parties of the 1950s.  
For them, European integration was the first step to build a basis for reunification.96  This 
result was derived from the CDU’s distinctive analysis of the causes of war.  They 
assumed that what had earlier led Germany to choose war was Germany’s “geographical 
and spiritual position between East and West.” 97   Given this proposition, sharp 
ideological division between West and East might lead to another war; moreover, in light 
of its territorial division, Germany was a significant front line.  In this sense, the 
integration strategy was a reflection of an extended sense of aversion to war as well as 
West Germany’s strong will not to repeat a path to militarism.   
After West and East Germany reunited and the Cold War ended, a united Federal 
Republic of Germany was positioned under a new security environment.  Germany was 
virtually liberated from the perception of threat from the Soviet Union.  Moreover, the 
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issues of rearmament and European integration no longer were parties’ security policy 
concerns.  Under this circumstance, the CDU began to consider expanding its degree of 
German defense integration into the European Community in the post-Cold War era. 98  
Indeed, down through the Cold War period, Germany developed a specific security 
identity with regard to the use of military forces.99  Despite acquisition of substantial 
military capacities, the use of military force was not considered as a security practice.  
Moreover, participation in military operations outside the NATO territory was regarded 
as unconstitutional military activities.  The Bosnian War was the first test that led 
German parties to reconsider the role of the German military.  The CDU favored 
expanded military roles for the following reasons:   
First of all, it was necessary for Germany to meet alliance requirements in order 
to show solidarity and pursue national interests in a multilateral context as was the 
custom in German statecraft.100  From the beginning the CDU had developed a keen 
sense of affinity with western European nations including the United States.  From the 
CDU’s perspective, western allies were indispensible partners since their national 
interests in economic and security were intertwined together.  Moreover, in the face of 
international criticism of “checkbook diplomacy,” the Kohl government became aware of 
alliance partners’ and the international community’s changing needs and burden sharing 
expectations.101  For them, taking responsibility for international peace missions was not 
out of the realm of consideration.  In consideration of a broader picture of national 
interests, maintaining a reputation as a reliable alliance partner was of critical 
elements.102    
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Second, meeting the needs of NATO and U.N. officials was a good opportunity to 
normalize German foreign policy in a way that linked to gaining military sovereignty.103  
In 1990s, politicians from the CDU turned their attention to normalization.  The Kohl 
government appealed to the people that “Germany must accept the normalization of its 
situation as a reunified, sovereign nation and deduce from this its international role.”104  
This view was reiterated by the CDU foreign policy spokesman Karl Lammers with his 
statement that “German… must… acknowledge its power… without forgetting its 
history; Germany must become as normal as possible.”105 One important dimension of 
normalization was being capable of using military force in international security affairs.  
Moreover, it was natural to take responsibility commensurate with Germany’s economic 
and military capability.  In this context, they agreed to not just U.N.-mandated 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions but also to out-of-area missions under 
NATO command regardless of U.N. recognition.106   
Third, the CDU translated Article 24 of the Basic Law into a German right to 
exercise collective security for alliance.107  For that reason, they did not much care about 
constitutional amendment in the Bosnian War discussion.  One CDU member expressed 
officially that “the CDU’s outright opposition to any constitutional amendment which 
requires a U.N. mandate for the use of force.” 108  In this way, the CDU recognized the 
existing constitution could give authority to accede to international military intervention 
in Bosnian War.   
In sum, with respect to security matters, the CDU’s underground stance was as an 
advocate of European security integration.  During the immediate post-Cold War period, 
the CDU developed a West German security identity under the framework of NATO.  Its 
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stance on the Euro-centric preference had guided the CDU’s security policy even after 
the end of the Cold War.  It constantly pursued security policies in the context of 
multinational institutions.  In particular, it further called on expanded security institutions 
not only NATO but also the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI), and the West 
European Union (WEU).109  It also stressed bilateral relations, with European nations as 
well as the U.S.  The Franco-German proposal for the creation of Eurocorp was a 
reflection of the Kohl government’s pursuit of the integration of Western European 
security policy.110  Moreover, it attempted a German security identity with a continued 
transatlantic security link without undermining U.S.-Germany bilateral relations 
including the presence of U.S. troops on German soil.  “The presence of the U.S. troops 
in Europe was indispensible for European security and stability.” 111  Likewise, the CDU 
in the aftermath of the reunification continued to adhere to previous security policy 
stances.  It not only preferred integration into the European community, but also the 
maintenance of transatlantic alliance relations with the U.S.  This stance was evidently 
detected when Germany confronted allies’ expectations for burden sharing in the Bosnian 
War, which occurred shortly after reunification.  Second, it pursued normalization of 
German stature in the international community.  With those stances on security issues, 
the CDU was the leading advocate of German participation in the war in Bosnia.  After 
unification, the CDU relied upon a similar set of boundaries to design security policies as 
it did at the foundation.  The CDU’s role in the evolution of German security identity will 
be discussed in the next section.  
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3. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) 
The revised SPD of the 1950s was heir to the largest and most tradition laden 
party in German history, with its heritage of anti-military practice.  Socialists thought 
reunification was of the highest priority as a security policy objective granted the party’s 
legacy in Saxony, now in the Soviet Zone as of 1948/9.  Kurt Schumacher, the first leader 
of the reorganized SPD, assumed that without complete reunification, no method, 
including European integration, would ensure national security or peace and stability on 
the European continent.112   What he embraced as national identity for a future Germany 
was a peaceful united independent nation with full sovereignty.113 Reunification was the 
prerequisite for rewriting the German future vision in the postwar years.  Therefore, he 
definitely did not convince himself of the strategy for “integration-first, step-by-step for 
reunification,” advocated by Adenauer, since it could hamper successful reunification and 
acquisition of full national sovereignty.114  In the SPD’s view, it was only reunification 
that ensured that there would be no repetition of past misbehaviors.  Moreover, the 
reunification was another indispensible source for defending national interests toward 
equal status with surrounding nations.115  
In this sense, the SPD embraced two security policy stances in the 1950s.  First of 
all, they opposed Adenauer’s path of rearmament and entry into NATO in the early years 
of German’s national foundation.  The SPD perceived joining NATO as part of a 
rearmament process.  For the SPD, it had the implication of showing West Germany’s 
lesser concerns about a deep sense of guilt about Nazism.116  Instead, the SPD preferred 
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eradicating the fundamental root to drive war.117  For them, the four powers’ grant of a 
peaceful East-West German reunification was the only way to prevent a recurrence of 
waging war among surrounding super-powers as well as nationalists—though the 
possibility of war from the latter was very low.  Indeed, the SPD thought that the 
rearmament and entry into NATO were attainable only after the four occupying countries 
allowed a united Germany.  The end state that the SPD admired at the onset of the 
postwar years was “the creation of a united, neutral Germany under the umbrella of some 
type of collective security arrangement involving all major European powers, including 
the United States, and the Soviet Union.” 118  
Second, the SPD, in the early postwar era, continued to advocate for distancing 
itself from the U.S. bloc including the West European Community, which was a 
mainstream tenet of the CDU’s security policy stance.  Instead, after the construction of 
the wall in 1961, the SPD valued Ostpolitik in view of rapprochement with the Soviet 
bloc including East Germany, East Europe and the Soviet Union.119  Chancellor Willy 
Brandt (1969-1974), the first chancellor from the SPD, was a symbolic figure of this 
Ostpolitik as it unfolded in the 1960s.120  He tried to lay a bridge between Eastern and 
Western Europe for a better relationship aiming at escaping the antagonistic front lines 
drawn in their territory during the Cold War.  Ostpolitik was a de facto modified line 
toward reunification, considering the fact that the final goal of this reconciliation 
approach was the unifying of East-West Germany in the form of “two states in one 
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nation.”121  This Ostpolitik was boosted by the international mood for détente in the 
1970s.  Yet, confronting a crisis of détente in the late 1970s that arose out of U.S./USSR 
frictions, the SPD recalculated how to pave the way toward reunification or at least 
sustaining contact with East Germany.  On the question of constant relations with the 
East, the SPD raised an anti-American and anti-ideological sentiment centered on the 
idea of “Europeanization of Europe.”122  At the same time, the SPD was well aware that 
the preservation of peace and unification between two German states was unattainable 
without shared views with the super powers, so the second SPD Chancellor, Helmut 
Schmidt, attempted to bring the superpowers to the negotiation table for a peaceful 
solution in the face of reemerging confrontation between the two blocs.123 
After the unification of the two German states, the SPD made a strong effort to 
normalize foreign relations with Eastern European nations.124  It proposed to expand the 
effective range of the European community system to the East to bring peace and stability 
across the Europe centered on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). 125   After unification, the SPD criticized the Kohl government’s efforts to 
broaden the operational mandates of its security institutions, viewing them as 
inappropriate attempts to use military integration as an engine of European integration 
and as increasing the probability of German involvement in military operations outside of 
the NATO area.126 
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This position certainly resulted from their new security perception after 
unification.  The SPD regarded Eastern European countries’ heavy weaponry, including 
nuclear weapon, as a core element of threat under the new security environment.  Thus, to 
ensure peace and stability in Europe, it was necessary that the collective security system 
(NATO) should attract east European nations.  The SPD deputy leader Oskar 
Lafontaine’s claim shed light on this position: “NATO security guarantees should be 
extended to Eastern Europe and successor states of the former Soviet Union in order to 
discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”127  Moreover, as shown earlier, the 
SPD’s shared deep sense of repentance over the past history underpinned one tenet of 
security policy stance, i.e., reticence to use force.128   Historically, for the 45 years in 
which Germany was divided, this policy stance of the SPD laid the cornerstone of 
German security identity of domestic antimilitarism.  Seen from the perspective of 
security stances framed through postwar years, it was no surprise to see the SPD’s 
opposition to military engagement in the Bosnian War. 
Based on this background of security policy stances, the SPD called for restrictive 
positions on participation in the Bosnian War.  In contrast to the CDU’s position, the 
SPD saw that the Basic Law legally banned the use of military force other than self-
defense and defense of its allies.  The SPD proposed to amend the constitution as a 
prerequisite for participation in the Bosnian War.129  The original stance of the SPD 
excluded U.N. peacekeeping operations on the basis of the Basic Law. They posed 
questions on the humanitarian attributes of peacekeeping operations by condemning 
them: “military interventions are not humanitarian actions, so peace enforcement means 
fighting wars.”130  Moreover, the ultimate aim of the SPD on the use of force discussion 
was to find effective solutions to unravel the conflicts.  For them, military engagement  
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would be very likely to worsen the situation rather than deter or stop the conflict.  In this 
regard the SPD preferred finding diplomatic or political solutions for crisis in the 
Balkans.131   
However, over time, the SPD began to share the view that the increasing 
catastrophe in Bosnia could not be resolved unless military force was involved under the 
command of the international security organization.132  The primary reason the SPD 
defected from the original SPD’s policy stance was the occurrence of a large number of 
human rights violations in the Bosnian War.  This made the SPD think that the coherent 
design of security policies that excluded military options could lead to outdated and 
inappropriate responses in international security matters.  But the SPD differentiated their 
rationale for the support of military intervention outside NATO territory from that of the 
CDU by drawing an explicit line between two positions.133  First of all, it clearly 
emphasized that its support had nothing to do with the CDU’s rationale with regard to 
alliance solidarity.  Second, it emphasized that participation in a foreign war would be 
possible only under a U.N. mandate.  By this definition, without a U.N. mandate, military 
intervention through NATO was strictly prohibited.  Third, they called for a 
constitutional amendment to establish a new role for the Bundeswehr so as to give 
legitimacy to the mission.134  Fourth, they insisted the engagement in combat missions 
be prohibited even if the missions were recognized by the U.N.  Their support was 
derived from the mission’s humanitarian purposes and their sense of responsibility to 
establish peace and stability throughout the world, motivated by their past history.   
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In sum, the SPD had developed a strong sense of antimilitarism and continued to 
apply this norm to real security practice.  During the Cold War, it saw its role as an East-
West reconciler and after the Cold War it placed its emphasis on bringing Eastern 
European countries to European society in order to shape peaceful conditions across 
Europe.  It displayed strong aversion to the use of military force for any reason, and as 
compared to the CDU, it embraced less allegiance to the Western European nations, 
including NATO.  The Bosnian War challenged the SPD to sustain its position on “no 
engagement in foreign wars outside NATO territory.”  In principle, its strict interpretation 
of the Basic Law did not grant military intervention in Bosnia.  Its stance began to change 
in the face of human rights violations, but its original reluctance still remained and 
caused friction.  As a major opposition party, the SPD’s opposition exerted great impact 
on the development of a new framework that guided new German security practice.   
4. The Free Democratic Party (FDP) 
Disbanded in 1933 under the Nazis’ reign, the FDP was reorganized in 1948 as an 
heir to the oldest German political party.  The FDP embraced European liberal ideals as 
core principles of national identity.  West German liberals joined the FDP party 
membership upon its reorganization, and consequently the FDP represented liberal 
economic policies including minimum government engagement in the marketplace.135  
No other party has been positioned as long in government office as the FDP.  From 1949 
on, when the first vote for Bundestag members took place, the FDP variously formed a 
coalition government with the SPD and with the CDU.  Only in the years 1998–2005 was 
the FDP in opposition.  It is important to note the FDP’s contribution to government 
stability and continuity in terms of policy execution.136  The FDP drew less attention to 
establishing a fixed security policy stance based on its own ideology, but rather paid 
more attention to consolidating a liberal economic order.  The FDP also embraced a 
western orientation with its NATO focus, but perhaps with less energy than had the 
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CDU/CSU in former times especially in the 1980s.  By adhering to a pragmatic stance 
within which security policies were designed, the FDP made itself able to form a 
coalition with either of the leading parties.   
Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that the FDP made use of its leverage in 
security affairs by changing its coalition partner when it thought the current government 
was following the wrong path of security policy for broad national interests.  One 
example was the FDP’s defection in 1969 from the CDU-FDP coalition when it saw that 
it “had become evident that in foreign affairs and internal politics, the CDU was not 
capable of giving up its outdated positions.”137  In its many years as a junior coalition 
partner, the FDP made several contributions to the national security concerning Ostpolitik 
and detente: (1) “by supporting membership in NATO, (2) advocating for cooperation 
with eastern European countries after 1969, and (3) supporting for the détente policy of 
the 1970s.”138  Thus, they sometimes adhered to the CDU’s security policy preference (in 
case of 1), and once to the SPD’s preferences (in case of 2 and 3).  After leaving the 
coalition with the SPD in 1982, the party made an effort to guarantee the continuation of 
the security policy that the SPD followed so as to damper the ideological pendulum in the 
security realm.139 
As a coalition partner to the CDU, the FDP played a critical role in the cabinet-
level discussion over war participation in Bosnia.  Their security policy stances were 
flexible.  The behavior of the FDP in security was centered on checking and balancing 
government decisions in order to prevent policy outcomes from leaning too far toward 
one side.  This pattern of behavior applied to the Bosnia War participation discussion, as 
well.   
The FDP position had two sides.140  On the one hand, like the CDU, it supported 
the U.N. peacekeeping operations.  On the other hand, like the SPD intervention 
supporters, the FDP insisted that the missions should be under the auspices of UNSCR. 
                                                 
137 Robert Gerald Livingston, Ibid., 45. 
138 Robert Gerald Livingston, Ibid., 45. 
139 Robert Gerald Livingston, Ibid., 45. 
140 John S. Duffield, op. cit., 183–185. 
 61
They also strongly advocated a constitutional amendment by which the military 
interventions would be legitimized.  The FDP differed from the SPD’s in that the FDP 
called for participation in combat missions once these were mandated by U.N. authority.  
Additionally, the FDP took a distinctive position on the decision making system under 
which the military intervention discussion took place.  In order to check government 
decision at the legislative level, the FDP demanded giving the parliament core leverage to 
pass the final bill stipulating military intervention when brought up for discussion in the 
parliament. 
5. The Greens 
The Greens was a union of politically organized intellectuals and activists such as 
environmentalists and peace activists constructed along with the grassroots democratic 
movement.141  It was officially created in southwestern Germany as a political party in 
January 1980 and enlarged its political influence to the extent to become a coalition 
partner of the SPD in 1998.  In contrast to the FDP, the Greens was an ideals-based party 
from the beginning.   The Greens focused on the issue of human rights, ecology, and 
peace when drawing policy initiatives.  They proposed a national initiative based on 
grassroots democracy where the individual right to self-determination and dynamism of 
social movements such as the environmental movement and peace movement were 
massively mobilized.142  It embraced pacifism with the rhetoric of “freedom from force, 
freedom from blocs.”143  Examination of the Greens is of significance since the party 
centered all its efforts to change the way of framing the security matters.   
First, the Greens strongly opposed engagement with either Western or Eastern 
Cold War blocs.  Second, it put forth an earnest voice for removing nuclear, chemical 
and conventional weapons of mass destruction in line with the peace movement.  
Similarly, it demanded greatly reduced defense expenditure.  For them, one salient 
mission was to expand the peace movement with the aim of bringing in a universal 
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disarmament.  Third, it embraced the concept of “social defense” through non violent 
and intense social contacts across the world.144  In this vein, it opposed the presence of 
U.S. military forces on its territory as well as rearmament.  Also, they hardly welcomed 
membership in the NATO system.  Instead, the Greens envisaged a new security 
paradigm under which individuals and social groups could guarantee their individual 
security themselves.145 
Based on the security policy stances formulated by peace activists, the Green 
opposed military intervention.  They were the most symbolic figure standing for 
antimilitarism in German politics.  Like the SPD, the Greens adhered to strong opposition 
to military intervention in the Bosnian War.146  In particular, the Greens were afraid of 
dynamic situations generated in the battle field.  They saw no clear cut distinction 
between peacekeepers and worriers in a combat zone.  The Greens feared that military 
engagement could not but lead to escalation of the crisis.  From this perspective, they 
proposed economic sanctions to bring peace in the Bosnian territory instead.  However, 
their firm opposition was ironic in the face of long-lasting war followed by massive 
human right violations, including genocide and ongoing attacks on civilians and 
peacekeepers.  Leading figures and experts including a leader of the Greens, Joschka 
Fisher, a foreign policy expert, Helmut Lippet, and a foreign policy spokesperson, Gerd 
Poppe, favored German participation, though their support was limited as with the 
SPD.147  Aligned with an SPD that demanded conditions for military interventions—i.e., 
a U.N. mandate, no combat operations, and a constitutional amendment—the Greens 
contributed to marginalizing radical changes in developing a new security parameter on 
the use of force. 
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D. PARTIES AS POLICY COMPETITORS 
May 1992 marked the first Bundeswehr participation in the U.N. peacekeeping 
missions in Cambodia—that is, the first operation outside of continental Europe in the era 
since unification and in the wake of the 1990-1991 Gulf War.  Germany’s 2,420 troops 
and 150 medical staff were deployed in the out-of-area peacekeeping mission.  December 
1992 saw Bundeswehr’ participation in Somalia with 1640 men deployed for logistics, 
transport and engineering missions. 148   According to RAND surveys, 56 percent of 
respondents agreed to military intervention where violation of international law and 
human rights took place.149 
However, in the case of the Bosnian War, German participation was a path to a 
more serious contingency.  That was the first time that the Germans had considered non-
peacekeeping operations outside NATO’s area.  As indicated above, NATO allies and 
U.N. officials both called on the German Bundeswehr’s eager participation.  This 
ultimately led to political debates in search of a new security identity.  The German war-
participation discussion could be divided into two stages: before and after the decision of 
the German constitutional court on Article 87a and Article 24.  July 1994 marked the 
conclusion of the debate on the constitutionality of the Bundeswehr’s participation 
alongside their allies outside the NATO area.150  The first stage included the debates over 
naval-air deployment in the Adriatic Sea (AWACS crew deployment).  The second stage 
included the debates on the deployment of ECR Tornadoes and the Rapid Response 
Force connected with UNPROFOR.  Of those four cases, the debate on the AWACS crew 
deployment was the most severe.  The debate lasted for two years from NATO’s initial 
request in 1992, and ended with the Constitutional Court ruling in 1994 that Germany 
was allowed to take part in future peace missions outside NATO’s area.  A case of 
AWACS deployment appeared to be an engagement in peace-enforcement operations 
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rather than a rear-area monitoring operation as in the case of an Adriatic Sea naval-air 
deployment, which helped implement an arms and trade embargo.151  It eventually served 
as a turning point in the evolution of Germany’s security identity.  This thesis mainly 
addresses the case of the AWACS crew deployment focusing on the implications of 
political parties’ basic stances and the evolution of Germany’s security identity.    
1. The Debate within the Ruling Party  
The CDU was an ardent supporter for participation in international military 
operations either of peacekeeping operations or for peace-enforcement operations.  The 
CDU thought that the military contribution was an imperative task under the new security 
environment and due to the expectations of the allies.  The CDU held the Bundestag: the 
CDU/CSU—FDP coalition held 398 of 662 seats.152  Yet the government’s majority did 
not reach the two-thirds level required to pass the needed resolution.  Moreover, the 
FDP’s 79 seats were crucial to the government’s majority.  Thus, at the cabinet level, 
negotiation and persuasion of the directed at the CDU’s coalition partner and at and 
opposition parties was necessary to implement the use of force plans.   
Indeed, the AWACS debate was an extension of the debate on the deployment in 
the Adriatic Sea.  When NATO took charge of monitoring the embargo in the Adriatic 
Sea, AWACSs were one of the assets involved.  In the face of NATO’s requests for 
solidarity with embargo monitoring, the Kohl government announced its intention to 
offer naval vessels and German AWACSs crews in support of the monitoring mission.153  
The government asserted that the deployment was necessary for improvement of alliance 
reliability and credibility.154  The presented rationale indicated that the government’s 
decision was affected by the CDU’s pro-NATO policy stance.  In addition, the 
government saw that the Basic Law allowed the deployment since its intention was not to 
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use force, but to monitor and gather intelligence.155  The SPD, filed a suit against the 
government decision in the Constitutional Court, but the court decided the mission was 
not against the Basic Law.156  In November 1992, Germany sent two destroyers in 
rotation to the Adriatic Sea and deployed AWACSs personnel to help monitor the arms 
and trade embargo.157    
However, confronting repeated violations of the no-fly-zone (almost 465 cases), 
the U.N. Security Council considered expanding the monitoring operation into an 
enforcing operation.  The AWACSs were expected to assume the enforcement of the 
sanctions.  From that moment on, the debate on the German AWACs crews’ involvement 
in the enforcement was heated.  NATO requested German assistance and U.N. officials 
urged Germany’s full participation in U.N. measures.158  The Kohl government was in 
favor of solidarity with allies’ will to enforce the ban on the no-fly-zone.  The CDU also 
contended that based on Article 24 of the Basic Law, which stated a right to participate in 
collective security for keeping peace, the AWACSs participation was not contradictory to 
the constitution.159  However, the SPD and FDP insisted that the military engagement be 
limited to “blue helmet” operations and the Constitutional Court’s official judgment to 
grant legitimacy to the participation beforehand.160  Since the enforcement was closely 
related to combat operations, the constitutional debate was much fiercer than the previous 
debate on the monitoring of the sanction.    
The FDP demanded the amendment of the Basic Law.161  They continued to hold 
the view that under the current Basic Law, the German crews should be pulled out of the 
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NATO AWACS aircraft patrolling the area.  In response to the coalition party’s 
willingness, the CDU’s special party conference produced a revised Article 87a (nature 
of national defense) of the Basic Law.162  
The FDP was satisfied with the CDU’s efforts to respond to its demand to amend 
the Basic Law.  At most, the presented prerequisite for “prior Bundestag approval” was a 
crucial device for ensuring civilian control.  Nevertheless, the FDP’s demands to 
constrain the AWACS mission did not end at that point.  Their basic concerns turned 
toward the type of missions the crews took charge of when deployed.163  The FDP drew a 
distinct line between peacekeeping operations and peace-enforcement operations. 164 
Throughout the whole debate period, there was discord between the CDU and the FDP 
and it was hard to come to an agreement.  The FDP threatened to break up the coalition if 
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the Kohl government faced more pressure from the NATO allies, in particular from the 
United States.  The summit meeting between U.S. and German leaders played a pivotal 
role in galvanizing the government’s decision.166  
Enforcing the no-fly-zone was agreed to by NATO in April 1993 and NATO 
forces were obliged to shoot down violators that refused to keep the flight ban over 
Bosnia.167  Despite a split in coalition parties, the Kohl government announced German 
crews would remain on board AWACS aircraft to help the NATO enforcement plan.  The 
government’s response provoked strong indignation from opposition parties, as well as 
the coalition party. 168  The FDP unprecedentedly allied with opposition parties in order 
to challenge the government’s decision before the Constitutional Court.169   It was very 
unusual to see the coalition partners suing their own government, but at the same time 
this demonstrated the FDP’s role in the evolution of the German security identity.  Due to 
the FDP’s commitment to filing suit, the government had risked possible collapse of the 
coalition.   
As shown above, through coalition partners’ efforts to impose limits to peace-
enforcement missions and amendment of the Basic Law, the government’s quick 
response to the NATO allies’ requests were substantially delayed.  During four months of 
discussion, since the government’s initial intention was publicized in December, 1992, 
the FDP constantly constrained the senior coalition partner from implementing the 
deployment based on two basic positions—no use of force in peace-enforcement 
operations and demands for a constitutional amendment.  The FDP’s demands and 
responses during the AWACS mission debate period reflected the political party’s role, in 
particular, as a mediator, to check the government’s decision.  During the process of the 
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AWACS discussion, it showed that the German security identity was challenged in 
earnest and how the parties’ positions influenced constructing the new framework to 
guide security policy making.   
2. Discussion with the Opposition Parties 
The roles of the main opposition parties, in particular the SPD and the Greens, in 
obstructing government decisions were based on a rationale similar to that of the FDP.  
As the FDP argued, the SPD and the Greens asserted that the use of German armed 
troops was not allowable within the context of the existing Basic Law.  But the two 
parties held to a narrower interpretation of the constitution than the FDP.  Whereas the 
FDP sought a constitutional amendment that would enable German troop’s contributions 
in blue helmet missions, the two parties initially did not agree with the internationalized 
roles of the German military.170  However, 1991 marked the agreement of three parties 
—the CDU, the FDP, and the SPD—upon the necessity of an amendment to the Basic 
Law.171   The situation by which the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) declared its intention 
to enforce the no-fly-zone over Bosnia further precipitated the parties’ movement on the 
constitutional amendment.  The SPD drafted a bill that amended the Basic Law to only 
accept non-combat blue helmet roles for German troops.172  Additionally, it called for the 
Constitutional Court’s clarification before every blue helmet mission was executed.173   
Dissimilarities between the CDU’s and SPD’s ways of changing the constitution were 
substantial.  Whereas the CDU tried to permit any form of military contribution, if the 
mission aimed to preserve peace and prosperity, the SPD only accepted the non-combat 
blue helmet missions regardless of the purpose of the missions.  Thus, the government 
proposal laid out in January 1993 for a constitutional amendment was not accepted by the 
SPD. 
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Without a consensus on how to legalize the use of armed forces abroad, the 
government’s pronounced will not to withdraw German AWAC crews outraged the SPD 
and the Greens.  They continued to think that the AWACS operations meant sending 
German combat troops outside the NATO area.  In addition, the SPD raged against the 
government’s unilateral decision making.174  Thereafter, the SPD, supported by the FDP, 
filed a complaint against the government decision in the Constitutional Court on April 3, 
2009.175  From the Court’s standpoint, it was not a simple legal matter, considering 
German crews made up one-third of the entire AWACS personnel who were essential to 
that operation.  Besides, on the one hand, the constitution could be interpreted as granting 
only a defensive military role on the grounds of Article 24, but on the other hand, it could 
be interpreted as acknowledging participation in collective security activities on the 
grounds of Article 87a.  
Taking those facts into account, the Court’s judgment on the AWACS missions 
gave more weight to political damage than jurisdiction factors. 176   In the end, the 
Constitutional Court, as in the case of the Adriatic mission, ruled in favor of the 
government’s position.  It made a judgment that German aircrews could participate in a 
U.N.-authorized mission to enforce the no-fly zone.177  Subsequently, the Constitutional 
Court added that “a continuation of Germany’s self-imposed restrictions on its military 
role would endanger the trust for Germany within the NATO alliance.”178  Likewise, the 
Court’s decision generated little effort to clarify the constitutionality of German military 
roles on international ground.  Instead, it highlighted the political damage when Germany 
continued to refuse the allies’ expectations to share the burdens of keeping international 
order and peace.  As a result, German aircrews took responsibilities for identifying  
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targets by flying in U.N. endorsed AWACS reconnaissance planes over Bosnia.  That 
became the first time that German military personnel engaged in a limited form of 
combat operations in the country’s postwar history.179   
Although the Constitutional Court had ruled in favor of the government’s decision, 
German participation in out-of-area missions still remained controversial.  Right after the 
Court’s approval of the German crews’ participation in AWACS mission was announced, 
one FDP Bundestag member criticized that “it did not mean that additional Bundeswehr 
deployment could continue to be unchecked.”180  Furthermore, the SPD parliamentary 
leader, Verheugen, warned the government by saying that “the government ought not to 
use the court’s ruling as a ‘free ticket’ to flex its military might in the future.”181  Outside 
politics, there were protest movements from citizens.  Some civilian protesters gathered 
in front of the NATO AWACS air base in order to demonstrate against the German 
soldiers’ flights in support of the U.N.-sanctioned enforcement operations.182 
In the course of the AWACS discussion, the opposition parties contributed to 
imposing considerable limitations on the government decisions.  Their most conspicuous 
roles were to raise consistent questions about the legality of the widened military roles 
under the Basic Law.  They filed suits against the government’s decision to participate in 
the naval blockade in Adriatic Sea and the AWACS air surveillance operations.  Based 
on their basic policy stance of reluctance to carry out armed missions, they preferred 
peacekeeping operations.  In opposition to the government’s unilateral decision making, 
they constantly insisted on the importance of civilian control over military deployments.  
The political gridlock that arose between the CDU and the opposition parties was not 
solved until the Constitutional Court ruling was issued in July 1994.  As the Court 
judgment in the AWACS case was based more on politics, the issue of the 
constitutionality of German military participation abroad was left open to debate.  The 
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SPD and Greens did not give up their policy stance on the issue of military participation 
in foreign areas.  They continued to ask whether German military participation in support 
of collective security activities was constitutional.  They also emphasized civilian control 
and required a constitutional amendment that included two thirds of parliamentarian 
approval when the German military took on missions outside the NATO area.183  Still, 
they favored using German armed troops only within the NATO area. 
E. CONCLUSION  
The AWACS discussion of the early to mid 1990s presented severe political 
deadlock formed by each party’s long-held basic positions on security issues.  The FDP 
was skeptical about sending troops into foreign areas.  Basically, the FDP supported the 
use of force under the U.N. mandate, but they believed that a constitutional amendment 
was necessary to permit the mission.  The FDP threatened to split the coalition when the 
Kohl government tried to approve German aircrews’ participation in the enforcement of 
the no-fly-zone over Bosnia.  The FDP considered the German aircrews’ flight in the 
AWACS planes as a combat mission, so it perceived the mission to violate the 
constitutional ban.  The SPD and the Greens also voiced their opinions against the 
government positions.  They barely recognized the necessity of German participation in 
peacekeeping operations.  However, they did not approve German troops’ participation in 
combat missions.  Therefore, the conflict with the CDU was hard to unravel.  The SPD’s 
and the Greens’ means of restraining the government decision was to clarify the 
constitutional justice of the mission.  They filed suits against the government before the 
Constitutional Court.  Owing to objections from the coalition party and opposition parties, 
the government’s decision making was considerably delayed.  The government had 
risked both relations with allies and the survival of the coalition government.  Although 
the Constitutional Court eventually sided with the government, the political battle over 
military deployment was not clearly concluded.   
The evolution of German security identity was finally concluded by the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling on July 12, 1994.  The court stated that German troops 
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could be deployed in all kinds of crises, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
missions out of the NATO area, as long as the bill obtained a simple majority of support 
in the Bundestag.184  It clarified that Article 24 of the Basic Law (collective security) 
provided the appropriate guidance on the question of out-of-area missions, and thus, 
German participation in military operations outside NATO territory would not violate the 
constitution.185  The Court’s ruling marked a turning point of German security practice.  
It eventually expanded the scope of the German military into “outside NATO’s area,” and 
ended the long-running debates on the constitutionality of German participation in 
collective security activities.  The ruling also installed a clear-cut device to ensure 
civilian control by insisting on prior Bundestag approval. 
The Court’s ruling bolstered the Kohl government's efforts to broaden Germany’s 
military role over the world.  But, it was important to keep an eye on the war situation in 
Bosnia when the Court decided on the constitutionality of out-of-area missions.  On 
February 7, 1994, Serbian forces attacked Bosnian Muslim civilians who were shopping 
in a central marketplace in Sarajevo, and as a result, dozens of civilians were killed.  
Increasing numbers of attacks on U.N. peacekeepers and even genocide were committed 
by Serbian troops.  Those situations led German political parties to shift attitudes toward 
the use of military force.  For instance, right after the Sarajevo marketplace attack, the 
SPD leader mourned the humanitarian tragedies and stated his willingness to support 
government efforts to stand up to such “terrible human rights violations.”186  Before the 
Bosnian War, political parties, as well as the German people, were still very aware of 
their past history.  However, the Bosnian War was a landmark case that cultivated an 
opposite impression of military forces which could make positive contributions to 
preservation of peace.  A wide consensus of German political parties as well as the public 
over the roles of military force ultimately produced the Constitutional Court decision.   
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From 1994 onwards, German military participation became a feature of routine in 
a world unsettled by growing conflict.  In June 1995, German troops and eight Tornado 
fighter planes supported a new NATO Rapid Reaction force and some German airmen 
joined air strikes on Serbian military forces.   However, one important thing to note about 
German troop participation in collective security coalitions was that it was determined on 
a case-by-case basis.  Throughout the political process, in particular during harsh political 
debate, Germany established a new security identity that guided new security practices 
concerning the use of force abroad.  The newly formed identity included four significant 
factors.  First, there must be a consensus in German society that the German military 
deployment would make contributions to the preservation of international peace and 
stability.  Widespread moral responsibilities for keeping world order in peace were an 
essential motivation to determine German participation.  Second, the deployment would 
be considered when the combat missions were conducted within a multilateral context.  
At most, there must be a consensus among alliance partners.  The acceptance of the 
military deployment would be increased when the U.N. mandated the mission.  Third, 
the military deployments were determined by civilian control which was represented by 
the approval of the Bundestag.  Those three factors indicate the evolution of German 
security identity in the new era.  This renewed identity guided new security practices with 
regard to military deployment in foreign areas.187  It was constructed in the wake of 
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Bosnian War, but as seen in the case study, political parties’ debates, based on their 
principles, were critical in producing the new consensual security identity.  Germany’s 
new security identity reflected a composite of each political party’s positions and was a 





IV. CASE STUDY OF JAPAN: THE WAR ON TERRORISM IN 
AFGHANISTAN AND EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE SECURITY 
IDENTITY 
A. SHAPING CONDITIONS FOR NEW SECURITY PRACTICES 
1. New Security Environment 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the security environment was starkly reversed 
from the previous four decades when Japan secured itself by virtue of its bi-polar 
stability.188  Several actors affected the shape of the new security environment in Japan. 
First, a major key player, North Korea, upset the regional security environment most 
significantly when the country fired the Taepodong missile in 1998.  Since then, Japan’s 
perception of the threat of North Korea has increased dramatically. Moreover, North 
Korea was at the center of no fewer than three nuclear crises within a decade.189   As a 
result, Japan redefined the instability and uncertainty of the situation on the Korean 
Peninsula as its major security concern from 1995 onward.190 
Second, China was another key actor that changed the security environment 
surrounding Japan. Challenges originated from China’s modernizing the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), upgrading its nuclear strike forces (1993), and launching its 
ballistic missile test across the Taiwan Strait (1996).191  Furthermore, the China-Japan 
territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands was seriously escalated when Chinese navy 
vessels were detached for exercises inside the Japanese EEZ in the vicinity of the 
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Senkaku Islands.192   A lack of transparency about the data China presented created 
concern about an unsecured regional security environment.  Japanese defense documents 
reflected a concern about the potential of Chinese capabilities from 1996 onward, mostly 
affected by the 1996 Taiwan Crisis.193   
The changing circumstances of regional security galvanized Japan to take on 
active roles on the international stage in line with U.S. strategy in East Asia.  As Hughes, 
one of the foremost experts on Japanese security policy, notes, revised guidelines 
declared in 1996 paved the way for Japan to “expand its potential role in supporting the 
U.S. to cope with regional contingencies.”194  In terms of security cooperation, Japan 
expanded its scope of alliance commitment.  For example, while its 1978 guidelines 
articulated the appropriate response to an armed attack against Japan, the 1996 guidelines 
expanded this to surrounding areas for the purpose of “contributing to the security of 
Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.”195  Under 
the new guidelines, Japan was obliged to exercise its active military roles, such as “rear 
area support” and “ship inspections” in the event of a military contingency.196  Moreover, 
the North Korean missile test-fire in 1998 and the nuclear crisis caused by North Korea’s 
unpredictable actions yielded milestones such as breaking long-sustained bans on arms 
exports (since 1967) and peaceful use of space (since 1969).  They also led to the 
establishment of a new legal framework, “Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law” 
in 1999, which gave Japan permission to provide “non-combat logistical support to U.S. 
forces” for contingency areas surrounded by Japan.197    
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As shown, the formation of a new security environment resulted in the 
reinforcement of the bilateral security relationship between Japan and the U.S. The 
situation further called on the SDF to assume broadened military roles on the 
international security stage.  The SDF dispatch in support of U.S.-led coalition forces in 
2001 reflected one aspect of strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance ties.  Despite its long-held 
security identity of restrictions on overseas deployments, Japan’s decision to take part in 
the U.S.-led coalition was thoroughly considered.   
2. Foreign Expectations   
In the wake of 9/11, Japan faced high expectations from the U.S. that called for 
Japanese military support for the U.S.-led coalition forces.  The U.S. military campaign 
against terrorists unfolded in the form of coalition building.  For Washington policy-
makers, it was significant that the war was not viewed as simply blind revenge by the 
international community. 198   Thus, the war against terrorism within a multilateral 
framework (rather than unilateral) was an important apparatus to legitimatize operations. 
In preparation for the retaliatory attacks following 9/11, the Bush administration called 
for “everyone to join them in a great coalition to conduct a campaign against terrorists 
who make war against civilized people,” and requested U.N. to support in all aspects.199  
The U.S. hoped that all allies would assume active roles in its military campaign.    
Confronting U.S. intentions to build a coalition, multilateral security 
organizations such as the U.N., NATO, and ANZUS, as well as individual countries, 
showed a strong willingness to keep solidarity with the U.S.-led military campaign for a 
retaliatory strike against terrorists.  The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1368 
to condemn the “horrifying terrorist attack,” and urged all states to take steps to respond 
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to it.200  Moreover, NATO allies officially invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which 
justified collective military responses against terrorist attacks.  NATO also announced 
that it would cooperate to push forward with a package of anti-terrorism measures by 
opening airspace for U.S. military operations and provide military troops, including a 
maritime presence.201  Australia and New Zealand invoked Article 4 of the ANZUS treaty 
to commit 1000 Australian troops to coalition forces.202 
The Bush administration called for Japanese participation in the war using 
rhetoric such as “show the [Japanese] flag in Afghanistan” and “put boots on the 
ground.” 203   The U.S. requests were launched in various areas including political, 
diplomatic, and economic.  The Bush administration wanted Japan to encourage Persian 
Gulf countries, including Iran and predominantly Muslim nations in Southeast Asia, to 
support the fight against terrorists using diplomatic measures.204  In terms of economics, 
during the summit meeting in Washington, President Bush asked Prime Minister Koizumi 
to “offer support in a wide range of areas, such as cutting off fund sources for terrorist 
organizations, helping to stabilize Afghanistan’s neighbors and giving aid to refugees, to 
wipe out terrorist forces worldwide.”205  Politically, the U.S. expected Japan to help with 
all measures, including military force.  Bush mentioned that “although Japan has 
restrictions on its use of force it should not lower the worth of the country as a U.S. 
ally.”206     
The U.S. hoped that Japan would assume a specific role as a significant U.S. ally 
as well as contribute to preserving peace and stability.  National security advisor 
Condoleezza Rice stressed this point by remarking that “Japan’s logistic support would 
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strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance politically and also would contribute to the peace and 
stability of the Asia-Pacific in the long run.”207  In the middle of the Japanese discussion 
on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Bill, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage urged Japan to quickly enact the legislation, and he mentioned: “I think that 
there are enough combat forces.  But certainly, there is a role for the Self Defense Forces 
in territorial defense.  Certainly there is a role in logistic support in the counterterrorist 
effort.”208  Indeed, the U.S. anticipated more support than the Koizumi government had 
prepared for, calling for the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) to protect the sea lane 
through the South China Sea and transport goods between Australia and Diego Garcia 
and other points.209 
This U.S. expectation was a critical motivation for Japan to consider SDF 
dispatch for the U.S.-led military attack in Afghanistan.  Additionally, the broad 
international solidarity following 9/11 made Japanese policy-makers revisit their Gulf 
War experiences.  What mattered mostly for Tokyo was to respond as quickly as possible, 
to show its willingness to help, and to distance itself from the attitude it was perceived to 
have in the Gulf War, which ended in failure to meet international expectations, 
generating widespread criticism.  Shortly after the 9/11 catastrophe, Japanese Prime 
Minister Koizumi made initial efforts to provide assistance by quickly instructing cabinet 
officials to devise measures to assist the U.S. military campaign, including SDF dispatch.  
In the economic arena, Japan froze assets and restricted the money flow of groups related 
to the Taliban, and provided U.S.$300 million for bilateral financial assistance to 
Pakistan and U.S.$18 million for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.210  In addition, it offered 
U.S.$102 million via the U.N. and other agencies to Afghan refugees and U.S.$500 
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million to rebuild the government and infrastructure of Afghanistan. 211   On the 
diplomatic front, Japan was an energetic intermediary between the West and the Middle 
East: it continued to keep good relations with the Middle East, including Iran, who in 
particular were hesitant to support the U.S. military campaign occurring in the vicinity of 
their region.212   
In sum, foreign expectations at the time of the war against terrorism in 2001 were 
exerted on Japanese policy-makers in various ways. The international situation 
surrounding Japan upon 9/11 was considerably similar to that of the Gulf War.  Many 
international states shared the objectives of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, as was the 
case in the Gulf War.  Japan was confronted with U.S. expectations to take diverse 
responsibilities on economic, diplomatic, and political fronts. The situation precipitated 
Japanese responses with military means, although the country had developed an identity 
of no participation in foreign wars. 
B. PARTY AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PUBLIC  
Political parties function as representatives of public opinion.  This section 
focuses on how public opinion was shaped in the aftermath of 9/11, and how it motivated 
Japanese political parties to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean.  Public opinion 
formed in favor of the U.S. helped facilitate Japanese support for the U.S. military 
campaign in Afghanistan.   
Immediately after 9/11, the Japanese public was united in criticizing the barbarous 
attack of terrorists.  Although the Japanese public had a long-held pacifist stance on 
security issues and was reluctant to support the use of force, public opinion moved 
toward acceptance of Japan as a contributor to the international community.  The 
following opinion polls conducted at the end of September 2001 show the trend of public 
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opinion.213  In each opinion poll, public support of the government decision is marked in 
bold, and public opinion in opposition to the government decision is marked in italic.   
∙ Yomiuri Shinbun  
Concerted international action is necessary to rid the world of terrorism  
I am worried that a terrorist attack might happen here 
I agree with the contents of the bill to enable the SDF to guard 
important domestic facilities  
I oppose the above-mentioned bill  
I support a build-up for the U.S. military action  
I oppose it  
Japan should co-operate "actively"  










∙ Asahi Shinbun 
I agree with Japan's support of the U.S. 
I oppose it  
I am in favor of dispatching the SDF for rear-area support  
I am against it  
I am against allowing the SDF to carry weapons  
I support the U.S. preparations for military action  








∙ Manichi Shinbun 
Japan should definitely extend help to the U.S.  
I am in favor of helping the U.S., depending on what Japan is asked 
to do 
I would support the transportation of supplies such as food in terms of 
logistical support for the U.S.  
The SDF should provide weapons and ammunition to the U.S.  
Japan should join the U.S. in battle   
I support the U.S. retaliatory strikes against those responsible for the 
terrorist attacks and those who harbor the terrorists  
I do not want the U.S. to use force  
I would describe the Sept. 11 attacks as "atrocious crimes"  
I understand that the terrorists committed the attacks "in defiance of a 
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∙ Nihon Keinzai Shinbun 
I oppose Japan providing the U.S. with logistic support  
I am in favor of a planned bill to enable the SDF to handle security 
for important facilities in Japan, including U.S. military bases  





The trend of public opinion influenced policy outcomes.  With the exception of 
the results of Asahi’s survey (which shows that 42 percent support the SDF dispatch and 
62 percent wanted to support the U.S.), the four polls demonstrate that almost over 60 
percent of respondents supported the government-led anti-terrorism measure plans. 
However, in the face of such specific questions as direct involvement in combat 
operations or transportation of combat weapons and ammunitions, the rate of support 
dropped steeply.  The polls showed that the Japanese were willing to support U.S. 
activities in the Afghanistan on the whole, but they still wanted to be cautious in terms of 
using the SDF in foreign territories.  However, the overall pattern of public opinion that 
condemned the terrorist attack and supported assistance for an ally remained high.  It was 
an important factor in participating the government’s quick reactions. 
It was true that public opinion affected the government’s choice of actions; in 
particular, the traditional pattern of security practices was significantly altered.  Japanese 
decision-makers have to consider public opinion when they design policies, and, in this 
sense, it can be argued that the decision regarding the 2001 SDF dispatch was, in large 
part, determined by public opinion.  However, an important role of political parties and 
the government is to shape public opinion by providing policies.  Namely, it has to be 
recognized that government plans come first and public opinion follows.  Thus, the actual 
decision-makers’ ideas and basic positions are important to note when the 2001 SDF 
dispatch in Indian Ocean is discussed.  
C. PARTY AS POLICY MAKER: POLICY ORIENTATIONS AND 
PARTIES’ BASIC SECURITY POLICY STANCES  
1. Brief Explanations   
Given that political party systems and organizations are reflections of parties’ 
diverse values and ideas about nation’s future, the occupation period which followed 
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defeat in WWII was a watershed in reshaping the Japanese party system.  When it came 
to interparty-cleavage in the postwar political setting, differing views on alliances and 
rearmament helped to shape Japan’s party alignment.  The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) 
and Japanese Communist Party (JCP) strongly disagreed with rearmament, constitutional 
revision, and the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which was an amalgam of what the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) had produced down through the occupation period and the early 
years of independence.214  Immediately, right after the postwar period, the LDP itself was 
divided into two groups of factions: pragmatist, whose beliefs and ideals sided with the 
Yoshida Sigeru’s emphasis on economic development rather than military buildup and 
revisionists, whose beliefs and ideals deviated from those of the pragmatists, in that they 
stressed normal military status.  The two groups represented divergent views how to 
forge U.S.-Japan relations given agreement to the U.S. security treaty and rearmament.  
Moreover, their views diverged on how to define future characteristics of national 
identity.   Later, upon the end of the Cold War, when the LDP’s one-party dominant 
formation disintegrated and resulted in the creation of several small parties, these 
divergences persisted.  Ozawa Ichiro departed from the LDP and formed his own party 
Shinseito, and later formed the Liberal Party in 1993.  Another important party was the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), born in 1996, with party members originally from the 
New Frontier Party (NFP), Sakigake, and the JSP.  The DPJ conceived a new approach to 
future characteristics of national identity.  Further discussion about the differences among 
parties will be presented in the next section.215 
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2. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)   
a. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Factions  
The LDP is composed of several factions.  The factions are, in essence, 
another form of party within the LDP.216  In brief, three main functions of factions are 
electoral support, fund raising, and distribution of a portfolio in the cabinet.  By nature, 
factions have little relation to policy making.  Faction identity was not defined by 
differences with respect to policy approaches or ideological divisions. 217   Rather, 
individuals’ pragmatic electoral alignment with each faction and the strong bond among 
members are the key to understanding the identity of the LDP factions.  Nevertheless, on 
security issues, factions’ identities are more distinct.  When tracing back the origin of the 
LDP factions and outlining different factions’ policy priorities in national security areas 
over several generations it is reasonable to group factions according to security policy 
positions. According to Bouissou’s argument, some faction leaders ardently advocate 
particular policies.218   Bouissou proposed two ways of grouping factions—“rightist,” 
represented by Kishi Nobusuke and Nakasone, and “leftist,” represented by Miki 
Takeo—in accordance with divergent national security outlooks.219  This thesis proposes 
a different division into two mainstream groups—Yoshida followers (pragmatists) and 
Kishi followers (revisionists)—on the basis of the author’s own analysis on security 
policies and future vision for national identity.   
Factions were formed when the former Democratic Party and the Liberal 
Party agreed upon the creation of the LDP and ushered in the so-called 1955 system.  At 
the time of the LDP’s launch, six major factions existed.  However, they have repeatedly 
split and reformed through the years.220  Factions from the former Democratic Party were 
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the Hatoyama Ichiro, Kishi Nobusuka, and Miki Bukichi (succeeded by Kono Ichiro) 
factions; those from the former Liberal Party were Yoshida Shigeru, and Ono Bamboku 
factions; and the independent with a small number of faction members was the Miki 
Takeo faction.221  Among the factions, in terms of national security positions, two groups 
tended to collide: those who followed Yoshida, and those who preferred more hawkish 
perspectives like Hatoyama, Kishi, and Miki Bukichi.  As a whole, factions composed of 
revisionists were generally from the former Democratic Party led by Hatoyama Ichiro; 
meanwhile, factions composed of pragmatists were from the former Liberal Party led by 
Yoshida Shigeru.  The genealogy of the LDP factions through 2002 is illustrated in 
Figure 1.   The two groups differed on security issues and related preferences for national 
identity, as related to such issues as relations with the U.S. and other Asian nations, 
Japan’s military role, and constitutional interpretation and revision.   
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Figure 1.   Genealogy of Factions (1955–2000) (From: Neary, 2002) 
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b. The Pragmatists  
Japan in its early postwar period was reconstructed based on the Yoshida 
doctrine, which emphasized economic development over the pursuit of military power 
with dependence on the U.S. security umbrella. 222   Yoshida’s successors, called 
pragmatists, played a leading role in reconstructing modern Japan during the Cold War 
era.  Their preferences for national security during the early postwar years passed down 
through the Yoshida’s successors’ reign, though his faction members divided into two 
groups—the Ikeda and Sato factions.  However, those two Yoshida inheritors shared 
similar views on national security and national identity.  Ikeda presented an income-
doubling plan in the 1960s, and Sato proactively adopted defense constraints such as non-
nuclear principles (1967), ban on arms exports (1967), and peaceful use of space (1969), 
and institutionalized the security policy making process.223  The pragmatists’ view on 
national identity now became Japan’s identity.  Economy-first policies made Japan the 
world’s second largest economy.   
Yoshida’s view of Japan’s future national identity was a “small maritime 
trading nation” in alignment with the United States not only for economic recovery but 
also for national security.224  This national identity as a “small maritime trading nation” 
put much more importance on economic recovery and development into a modern, 
democratic, and progressive industrial society than other possible national agendas.  
Economy-first policies sacrificed a part of national sovereignty in that they imposed 
limitations on national defense in line with the constitution.  Instead, this strategy 
proposed another way to work around the constitutional ban on acquisition of military 
forces: to depend on U.S. troops in Japanese territory.  Thereafter, Japan could save 
defense expenditures in return for firm solidarity with its alliance partner; and with the 
unused monies, it could accelerate rapid economic recovery.  This was the reward for 
becoming a “small maritime trading nation” without much exercise of national influence.  
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The core elements of the early pragmatists’ security policy position were 
connected to the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty (1952).  On account of the security treaty, 
Japan could be shielded from neighboring countries’ worries about the specter of the 
restoration of Japanese militarism.  In addition, the Japanese felt safe despite a deficiency 
in their military abilities because of the stationed U.S. troops.  
Pragmatists were attracted to Yoshida’s belief in the usefulness of Article 
9, which has primarily guided Japanese security practices through the years since the 
mid-1940s.  The constitution provided clear provisions regarding renouncement of war, 
forever.  But spite of the peace clause forbidding possession of military forces, Japan 
established the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954.  Since the creation of the SDF, the 
pragmatists accepted modifications in constitutional interpretation but were cautious 
about revising it outright.225  They proposed an orthodox constitutional interpretation: 
Japan was excluded from exercising collective security and the use of forces was only 
legitimized for the purpose of self defense.226  In terms of collective self defense, the 
official interpretation of pragmatists was dual: on the one hand, Japan had the right of 
collective self-defense under international law but, on the other, was prohibited from 
exercising it under Article 9. 227   When the Peacekeeping Law was adopted, the 
constitutional ban on SDF’s engagement in international security affairs was arguably 
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marginalized, but pragmatists did not want to revise Article 9 of the Constitution.228  
They preferred a broader interpretation of the Constitution and believed that the SDF and 
U.S.-Japan security alliance did not contradict the Constitution.  Given the constitutional 
context, the SDF was employed only for the purpose of self-defense.   
The Yoshida Doctrine served as the basis of Japanese security practices 
through the years of the Cold War.  As security environments have vividly changed since 
then, the pragmatists have added new principles of basic security policy guidance, but 
without departing from the original stance of priorities of economic growth and low 
defense spending and firm reliance on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.    
One significant change in terms of security policy principles is an 
introduction of a concept of comprehensive security. Throughout complicated 
international situations from oil shock to the new Cold War, one pragmatist-successor 
prime minister, Ohira put forward the idea of comprehensive security in the early 1980s.  
The concept of comprehensive security was rooted in a new way of framing national 
security policies by emphasizing that national security was guaranteed not by only 
military means but also by various policy instruments.229  It certainly saw a military 
approach as an important pillar of enhancing national security, but this was not the only 
way.  Comprehensive security incorporated economic, diplomatic, environment, energy, 
and military issues into security policy-making.230  Comprehensive security called for 
mutual cooperation with the international community on various issues.   This approach 
extended to call for maintaining peaceful relations with Asian nations including China 
and for working together with them to construct economic cooperation institutions.  More  
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recent LDP leaders who stress pro-Asian economic relations from the comprehensive 
security stand point have been Kato Koichi, Yamasaki Taku, Koga Makoto, and Kono 
Yohei.231   
The other principle pragmatists adopted in the 1990s was an expanded 
military role.  The Yoshida Doctrine set forth principles of national policies inclined 
toward the primacy of the economy and a limited military.  However, since the 1990s, 
and faced with a new situation with respect to security matters, the pragmatists adopted 
new security policy packages, which were exemplified by the pragmatists’ Miyazawa 
Kiichi’s endorsement of the Peacekeeping Law in 1992. 232   The pragmatists had 
acknowledged Japan’s responsibility for making international military contributions to 
international peace and stability.  In that regard, they approved using the SDF for U.N. 
peacekeeping operations.  
From then on, pragmatists saw the value of military forces’ contributions 
to the preservation of peace and stability.  However, their core beliefs about security 
policy, such as the value of the U.S.-Japan alliance system and limited emphasis on the 
military power, still remained.  They favored making non-military contributions by 
offering economic assistance to underdeveloped countries and believed that the U.S.-
Japan alliance was indispensible in the pursuit of Japan’s national security.  To be sure, 
their preferences were restrained to non-combat contributions like peacekeeping 
operations under U.N. mandates.  They reinterpreted the constitution so that it granted the 
right to an SDF to take part in international security affairs with the aim of international 
peace and stability.  These pragmatists were opposed to the amendment of Article 9 of 
the constitution in order to explicate the SDF’s role that departed from the traditional 
pattern. 233   Rather, they preferred changing the interpretation of the constitution to 
accommodate a larger role for the SDF.  Miyazawa Kiichi was the representative 
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protector to the constitution’s peace clause.   Contemporary LDP pragmatists include 
former Ikeda-factional-lineage faction members like Kato, Koga, Kono, Miyazawa, and 
current LDP president Tanigaki Sadakazu; some members of the Tanaka-Takeshita-
Hashimoto factional lineage such as Nonaka Hiromu; and the Yamasaki faction (the Near 
Future Political Research Group). 234   In discussing the SDF dispatch in 2001, the 
pragmatists played a significant role in reviewing government decisions and debating 
policy outcomes. 
c. The Revisionists  
In the early period of the LDP’s creation, Hatoyama Ichiro, Miki Bukichi, 
Kono Ichiro, and Kishi Nobosuke were influential leaders in the LDP.  Later, Hatoyama’s 
followers were merged into the Kono faction following the two faction leaders’ deaths 
(Hatoyama and Miki).  Both Hatoyama and Kishi were passionate of a high security 
profile.  Hatoyama was more of a “right autonomists” in that he earnestly supported equal 
diplomatic standing with the United States and other countries including the Soviet Union.  
Kishi, however, emphasized U.S.-leaning equal relations while remaining alienated from 
Communist countries.235  
Revisionists argued Japan should be a normal nation.  In the early postwar 
period, LDP revisionists developed the national identity of “normal nationhood” in 
opposition to Yoshida.  They criticized the Yoshida Doctrine’s de-emphasis of national 
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security matters.236  Revisionists aimed to restore sovereignty in security affairs similar to 
that of other independent counties through Japan’s own military capabilities.237  Their 
positions were not opposed to the U.S.-Japan alliance system, but emphasized being a 
more independent state in the context of reliable relations with its ally.  In this regard, 
they favored rearmament, more equal alliance relationships, and revision of the 
constitution.   
In the early postwar period, revisionists in the LDP tried to realize the idea 
of a normal state through the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.  Revisionists’ 
ideas of the revision were not derived from anti-U.S. sentiment.  Rather they devised a 
sovereign right of national defense.238  Under revisionist Prime Minister Kishi’s reign, 
the new security pact was forcefully passed despite the huge anti-revision campaign of 
some members of the LDP,239 progressive intellectuals, leftist activists, and students on 
19 May 1960.240     
Once Prime Minister Kishi resigned due to repercussions of this 
aggressive legislating, the LDP revisionists were forced out of power until ardent 
revisionist leader Nakasone became Prime Minister in the mid-1980s.  During this period, 
revisionists were positioned in the non-mainstream factions in the LDP, and Japan had 
grown into a major economic power.  In the early 1980s, revisionist groups in the LDP 
returned to power.  The “normal nation” rhetoric had significantly progressed by that 
time.  The United States’ calls for burden sharing in the realm of Japanese national 
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defense met with the revisionists’ favor.  The revisionists supported a strong military 
buildup, and provided bountiful host-nation support in response to Japan’s ally’s request 
for burden sharing.  
In the early post-Cold War period, the revisionists’ idea of “normal 
nation” turned to a new front.  There is no doubt that the failure to join international 
coalition forces in the Gulf War led to incremental consideration by the Japanese for 
military contributions in international security affairs.  Revisionists, meanwhile, saw 
“normal nation” within the parameters of having the right to defend the nation by its own 
capabilities.  Security cooperation with the international community was not their 
concern.  But in the aftermath of the Cold War, revisionists translated “normal nation” 
into Japan’s assuming Japan’s role in the world in order to keep world order from being 
disrupted.  Ozawa Ichiro was an ardent provocateur who urged taking greater 
international responsibilities, not only by economic means, but also by military ones.  
Through the present, this revisionist view of “normal nation” has laid the foundation of 
their positions on security issues.     
Contemporary revisionists in the LDP came to value two security 
principles.  First, they favored taking on a more active military role in international 
security affairs.  Yet their rationale to take the expanded military role did not originate 
from the goal of becoming a military hegemonic power.241  They gave much emphasis to 
their obligation to shaping international order as a member of the international 
community.  Second, LDP revisionists perceived the U.S.-Japan alliance system as the 
core shield of national security.  In this sense, LDP revisionists were seen to share the 
same principle as the pragmatists, with a U.S.-leaning disposition and emphasis on 
international military contributions.  However, the two groups differed over the degree of 
military involvement in world security affairs.  Whereas the pragmatists’ position agreed 
to take on military engagements within the parameters of U.N. sanctioned non-military  
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peacekeeping operations, revisionists further argued for an entrance into the collective 
defense system through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty or the United Nations regardless 
of the mission type.242   
In addition, the two groups differed in their views of constitutional 
revision. Revisionists are long-standing advocates of constitutional revisions, the primary 
target of which is Article 9.  Pragmatists interpreted Article 9 as permitting the right to 
maintain self defense forces as well as become involved in foreign military tasks; in their 
view, there was no need for a revision of Article 9.243  But revisionists assert that the 
section calling for “relinquishing armed forces” should be rewritten as “maintaining 
armed forces for Japan’s independence and peace.” 244  In addition, since the exercise of 
collective self defense was prohibited in accordance with the orthodox interpretation of 
Article 9, revisionists constantly called for the insertion of an additional phrase that 
manifests Japan’s right to exercise the right of the collective self-defense in Article 9.  In 
terms of collective self-defense, revisionists favor defense cooperation within the 
parameters of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Nakasone accentuated this point when proposing 
constitutional revisions.  He stressed that the right of collective self-defense should be 
limited to relations with the U.S. when Japan’s independence and peace were involved, 
and that the decision to exercise that right should be determined by Japan’s own will.245    
The revisionists dominated leadership of the LDP in the 2000s.   In 
particular, Koizumi laid the groundwork to make their vision of “normal nation” a reality.  
He built up strong military capabilities and reconfirmed strong alliance ties with the 
United States.  Also, as a result of his order to draft a revised constitution, in October 
2005, the “draft of a new constitution” was published.246  According to the draft, the first 
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clause of Article 9 remained intact.  The second clause of Article 9 was revised to allow 
military forces under the command of the prime minister.247  The draft additionally 
inserted a third clause stipulating that defense forces could cooperate in international 
security affairs as well as have responsibility to maintain social order at home.248  In 
addition, Koizumi played a leading role in Japan’s military involvement in the war 
against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Subsequently, Abe took over the prime 
ministership and pursued many policies in security areas.  Abe upgraded the JDA to the 
Ministry of Defense and tried to launch a National Security Council which, however, 
ended in failure.  
Contemporary representative LDP revisionists have included the 
Machimura faction (Seiwa Policy Research Group) members such as Junichiro Koizumi, 
Shinzo Abe, Yuriko Koike, Ichita Yamamoto; now-Tsushima faction members, including 
Shigeru Ishiba; Aso faction members; and other independent LDP members such as 
Yasuhiro Nakasone and Shingo Nishimura.249  As a key revisionists figure, Koizumi 
played a leading role in deciding to dispatch the SDF in 2001.  The revisionist 
government, key policy-makers at the time of 2001 dispatch discussion, actively 
launched Japan’s basic plans in response to 9/11. The Japanese government’s decisive 
reactions and quick dispatch of the SDF reflected the LDP revisionists’ approach toward 
security policy. 
3. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ): From Creation to Now  
The DPJ emerged as the major opposition party of the post–1955 system era by 
amassing members whose past affiliations ranged from socialist parties (the Japanese 
Socialist Party (JSP) which later evolved into the Social Democratic Party of Japan 
(SDPJ)) to the centrist parties (the New Frontier Party (NFP) and the Democratic 
Socialist Party of Japan, (DSPJ)), and conservative parties (the Liberal Party, Sakigake 
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and the LDP).  It finally won control of Japan’s government as a result of the 2009 Lower 
House election.  The origin of the DPJ can be traced back to a politically tumultuous 
period around the end of the Cold War and the economic recession.  Neither the long-
time-ruling government, the LDP, nor the newly formed coalition government, led by 
Hosokawa (1993) and Murayama (1994), were empowered to launch necessary reform 
projects.  While the opposition parties were initially ill-positioned against the LDP, the 
DPJ, initially formed by four parties’ merger, expanded its political scope by absorbing 
dispersed opposition parties with repeated mergers during that period.  The DPJ’s in 
incorporating the Liberal Party—led by Ozawa Ichiro 250 —in 2003 completed the 
formation of the party as it stands now.    
Given its mixed membership, it is hard to define the DPJ’s policy stance on 
national security. It has pre-socialists who once denied the legitimacy of the SDF and the 
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.  It also has former-LDP party members with roots in both 
LDP pragmatist groups and revisionist groups.  Moreover, the creation of the DPJ was 
not a result of a stark reversal with regard to security policy ideas in comparison with the 
LDP, but rather of an anti-LDP movement whose members were weary of the LDP’s 
stagnated political bureaucracy and long-lasting corruption.  When the party’s leaders 
announced its creation on September 28, 1996, they offered three party objectives: (1) to 
break up and rebuild the nation’s administrative system, (2) to transform politics from 
bureaucracy-centered to citizen-centered, and (3) to create welfare society that would 
care for increasing numbers of elderly people.251  This implied the DPJ distinguished 
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itself from LDP on domestic issues rather than security issues.  Besides, amid uncertain 
international circumstances, as Green has pointed out, there was no doubt that political 
parties’ views on the security agenda were more likely to be “a bell curve” than “two 
opposing poles.”252   
However, despite an uncertain line and a trend of overlapping positions on 
national security issues among parties, the DPJ surely embraced different views from the 
LDP on national security issues as well as national identity.  Though the party contains 
several ideological strands, from leftist to conservative, the party has not been fully tested 
as to whether former party affiliations will create interparty disruption of party 
dissolution when making decisions on the critical security issues.  Thus, discussion of the 
DPJ’s basic principles on security issues mainly relies on the party’s manifesto and key 
leaders’ views on national identity and security policy.   
As a recently formed party, the DPJ developed a different vision of future national 
identity than other Japanese parties.  The new idea might be labeled a “globalized, 
pacifist normal” nation. 253   This national identity is similar in many ways to the 
revisionists’ “normal nation.” What notably differed was that the DPJ’s positions were 
more globally-oriented than U.S.-oriented, which was mainly due to the party’s mixed-
membership.  The party’s security policy principles can be summarized in three 
dimensions.  First, the DPJ officially assented to the U.S.-Japan alliance system, calling 
it a major pillar of Japanese security as well as regional stability.254  The DPJ evaluated 
the U.S.-Japan alliance from two viewpoints.  On one hand, its rationale was similar to 
that of the pragmatists of the LDP, given its support of defense-oriented military 
cooperation with the U.S.  On the other hand, it found itself in a vein similar to the 
pacifists given its stance of hoping for a more autonomous position in relations with the 
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U.S.255  The party platform before 1997 even had a phrase calling for “the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty without permanent stationing of U.S. forces.”256  Although the phrase 
was marginalized through more positive terms from 1997 onward rewritten as “Japan will 
maintain Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement…while managing these arrangements 
effectively and in a balanced manner through closer consultation with the United 
States,”257 the DPJ still gave weight to a self-reliant security policy.258  The leading left-
leaning figure, Yokomichi Takahiro, opposed any form of overseas activities and 
constitutional revision, in contrast to the conservative-leaning members’ support for the 
revision.259  The existence of the former socialist group made the DPJ’s security policy 
stance reflect a pacifist orientation.  
Second, influenced by the former right-leaning party members, the DPJ sought to 
find Japan’s role in international politics.  This approach was favored by the largest group 
within the DPJ, made up of those who supported Ozawa and Hatoyama.  Ozawa Ichiro 
pictured Japan as a globally influential nation contributing to international politics as 
much as to its own economic capacity.  Ozawa held that Japan’s national security 
objectives should leap to the “peace-building strategy” from its long-held stagnated 
“exclusive defense strategy.” 260   Hence, he proposed enhanced defense capabilities 
toward taking a larger scope in military roles.  Also, he proposed the appointment of a 
chief cabinet secretary as a senior advisor similar to the National Security Advisor in the 
United States.  However, in his view, the defense buildup was not for becoming a world 
military power, but for sharing responsibilities of keeping global peace and freedom.261   
In this regard, Ozawa’s view on Japan’s overseas military role is very similar to those of 
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two groups within the LDP.  On the one hand, he called on Japan to take responsibilities 
in peacekeeping operations as did the pragmatist group.  On the other hand, he wanted to 
enhance military capabilities as the revisionist group did.   As a former LDP Secretary 
General during the first Gulf War period, he was an initiator in laying out these policy 
proposals.  Ozawa then transferred these views into the DPJ and made them the main 
pillar of the DPJ policy.  He then took them one step further by making efforts to 
institutionalize a responsibility for international peacekeeping.  He openly suggested 
permanent legislation enabling overseas military missions and creation of a military force 
separate from the SDF in order to take on regular U.N. peacekeeping duties.262 
Third, the DPJ differentiated itself from the LDP by giving more weight to Asian 
neighbors than to the United States.  In 2005, Hatoyama gave a speech to the congress of 
the Liberal International held in Sofia and stated that “the DPJ is more concerned with 
striking the right balance in Japan’s relations with the U.S. and Asian neighbors than with 
putting slightly more emphasis on the latter.”263  Instead, it stressed a U.N.-centered 
multilateral approach in security matters and regional cooperation with East Asian 
neighboring countries including China and South Korea.264  The DPJ offered a proposal 
to build a cooperative mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region.  When it came to presenting 
a detailed initiative for establishment of an East Asia community, the DPJ followed the 
pragmatist group’s comprehensive security approach.  Namely, it delineated an East Asia 
cooperative mechanism focused on non-military measurement such as “trade, finance, 
energy, the environment, disaster relief and measures to control infectious diseases.”265 
However, prioritizing improved relations with Asian nations was not necessarily coupled 
with deemphasizing U.S.-Japan alliance ties.  The DPJ considered the U.S.-Japan alliance 
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a foundation of national security, as did the LDP.  It further saw the U.S.-Japan alliance 
as a significant contributor to keeping regional order in East Asia.266   
The DPJ, led by Hatoyama and Ozawa, favored constitutional revision.  In 
October 2005, the DPJ compiled “a proposal for a constitution.”267  As with the LDP’s 
proposal, it retained the first clause of “renouncing war as a sovereign right” untouched, 
but removed the second clause of “renouncing war potential.”  But the DPJ’s views 
differed from those of the LDP to some degree.  The DPJ paid more attention to a U.N.-
centered use of force as compared to the LDP, which only stipulated the right to take part 
in international security affairs.  The DPJ emphasized that the revision of the constitution 
aimed to legitimize the use of force abroad on the basis of UNSC resolutions.268  It held 
that a reason for the revision was to establish a legal standard to permit the exercise of 
collective defense in order to eliminate the vagueness of constitutional interpretation.  
Without having legal parameters defining conditions for the use of force abroad, they 
argued, decisions on collective defense might be drawn from an arbitrary interpretation of 
the existing constitution.269  The constitutional revision was one important plank in the 
party manifesto.  
As indicated in the national identity of “peaceful-globalized-normal” nation (the 
author’s coinage) the DPJ’s security policy stance is difficult to reduce one dominant 
rationale.  Some factions put more focus on a pacifist approach, whereas other factions 
focus more on a realistic approach similar to that of the revisionists.  In such specific 
areas as military roles, some factions held similar view to the LDP pragmatists.  The DPJ 
was saddled with remarkable divisions over the U.S.-Japan relationship because of 
ideological divisions among party members.  However, in principle, the party would not 
likely defect from the alliance ties given its manifesto and key leaders’ reluctance to bow 
to the old pacifist rhetoric of neutral autonomy.  Given this complex and contradicting 
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stance on security issues, the DPJ in the near future is likely to take multi-directional 
approaches that avoid leaning toward one side of the policy spectrum.   
When the SDF discussion occurred in 2001, party formation had not been 
completed; the Liberal Party, led by Ichiro Ozawa, merged with the DPJ in 2003.  Thus, 
Ozawa’s position preferring U.N.-centered military contributions was not as strong as 
influence on party’s position.  He starkly opposed the government decision to dispatch 
the SDF without a U.N. Resolution.  The DPJ position was constructed by its basic 1999 
principle valuing the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Party leader Hatoyama as well as the 
conservative and center-right majority of the party, favored the overseas dispatch.  
However, DPJ positions were divided, since the former socialist group opposed the 
decision.  Hatoyama indeed had difficulty in creating party unity.  
4. Pacifist Parties   
The policy stances of the JSP, which later evolved into the Social Democratic 
Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the JCP were the most important pillars of their identities.  In 
the immediate postwar years, they advocated “unarmed neutrality.”270  Neutrality for 
them was full independence from U.S. occupation.  It also meant establishing normal 
state which maintained equal relations with foreign countries other than the United States.  
Their conception of national identity was centered on three points: (1) protection of the 
constitution, (2) opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and (3) opposition to 
rearmament. After rearmament was concluded, their efforts concentrated on resisting 
defense buildup and use of the SDF.271   
Since their foundation, the JSP and JCP had embraced those three points as core 
principles of their policy.  Throughout the Cold War years, the JSP was the largest 
opposition party, although their seats were not close to a majority in the Diet.  The JCP 
had an ideological connection with the Soviet Union, but it pursued independent paths of 
communism rather than following Moscow’s and even criticized the Soviet Union in the 
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face of the Sino-Soviet War.272  The JCP had the strongest ideological supporters and 
even further argued for nationalistic pacifism which included not only the three points of 
the pacifists’ principles but also claims of returning the Northern Territories.273  Another 
opposition party, Komeito, founded in 1964 as the political arm of the new Buddhist 
religion of Souka Gakkai, followed the pacifist ideas in terms of security policy.  Their 
security policy stance stood by protection of the constitution and opposition to 
rearmament and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.274 
The pacifist parties’ achievements of their security policy goals peaked in the 
1960s when they made Kishi step down as prime minister.  But overly strong adherence 
to ideology left these parties unable to challenge the LDP.  Throughout their history, they 
argued for opposite paths of security policy compared to the LDP.  They favored 
improved relations with the Soviet Union and Asian countries.275  However, the LDP’s 
accomplishment of rapid economic growth placed the opposition parties into a downward 
spiral throughout most of the Cold War period.  Not only that, ideological divisions 
within the opposition parties contributed to the declining fortune of the pacifist parties in 
Japan.  Moderate socialist members left the JSP and created the Democratic Socialist 
Party (DSP) in 1960.  They acknowledged the existence of the SDF and advocated a 
different model of socialism.276  Although pacifist parties had low electoral appeal and 
struggled with ideological divisions, they represented Japanese pacifist ideas and played 
key roles in keeping Japanese pacifist paths in security policies, along with the LDP 
pragmatists.  
The 1990s saw the JSP radically depart from pacifist ideology.  Prime Minister 
Murayama Toimiichi abandoned the party’s long-time beliefs - objection to the 
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constitution and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty—upon forming a governing coalition 
with the party’s former rival the LDP.  He acknowledged that the presence of SDF was 
not contradictory to the constitution.  He also admitted that the U.S.-Japan alliance played 
a vital role in maintaining peace and stability under the current regional security 
environment.  He officially announced that he would no longer follow the value of 
“unarmed neutrality” any more. 277   In addition, once Komeito formed a coalition 
government with the LDP, it also changed its original objection to the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance and rearmament.  It became a generous supporter of U.S-Japan relations and the 
SDF.278  Now, the SDPJ is a small minority party, having been eclipsed by the DPJ, and 
has returned to its original security stance of denouncing the SDF and the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty.279  Komeito, however, found it difficult to apply their principles in real 
politics.  
However, pacifist parties are key players in preserving the pacifist element of 
security policy in Japanese politics.  Their ideas still exert a great impact on various types 
of Socialist-influence members of the Diet, including former-Socialist members of the 
DPJ.  The principle of “neutrality” was modified into an objection to U.S.-Japan military 
cooperation.  The principle of “unarmed” turned itself into objections to the strength of 
military capabilities.  Pacifist parties inherited two modified principles and led the Diet’s 
opposition against pro-U.S. and pro-armament policy.  Also, they strongly opposed the 
revision of Article 9 of the constitution.  With these basic stances in the discussion about 
the SDF dispatch in 2001, they stood firmly in opposition to the government decision to 
dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean.   
5. The Komeito    
Since its foundation, the Komeito had held onto pacifist ideas, though its primary 
founding objective and policy goals reflected religious purposes.  The Komeito was 
closely associated with the religious organization Soka Gakkai, which developed a new 
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religious, as well as social, movement based on Buddhist dogma.  In line with the Soka 
Gakkai’s prioritized values of pacifism and the protection of human dignity, the Komeito 
functioned as a mediator to transform the social movement into a political one by forging 
a specific political agenda based on these values.280  On the ideological front, it opposed 
the idea of constitutional revision, as did the pacifist parties.281  However, unlike the two 
pacifist parties, the Komeito acknowledged the existence of the SDF.282  In this sense, 
from the outset and in principle, the Komeito could be categorized as a moderate pacifist 
party.  However, in practice, the Komeito was much more interested in general social 
welfare and religious freedom than security matters, so its position was less resilient than 
that of other pacifist parties.  In a pure sense, it was more of a centrist-pacifist rather than 
a pacifist party. Based on its positions regarding security policy, it would appear that it 
would be opposed to participating in the SDF dispatch, but in practice it compromised its 
basic stance on security with the LDP by supporting the LDP’s plan for the SDF dispatch 
as a junior partner of the coalition government. 283   However, Komeito played a 
significant role in shaping specific plans for participating in the war, as discussed in the 
next section.   
D. PARTIES AS POLICY COMPETITORS  
In terms of the Japanese security identity of domestic antimilitarism, the decision 
to dispatch the SDF to Afghanistan could be viewed as a radical break from traditional 
Japanese security policy.  However, it should be noted that the 2001 dispatch was limited 
to rear-area logistic support.  Limitations on the decision were imposed by the 
government and reflected various political discussions with the cabinet and Diet members.  
As a result of this decision, a new paradigm with regard to using force outside Japanese 
territory was implemented.  The next section focuses on the results of the political debate, 
examines how political parties’ respective positions influenced the process of political 
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debate, and discusses how the final decision was modified from the government’s 
original initiatives.  Subsequently, it concludes that through the landmark experiences of 
the overseas military dispatch of 2001, Japanese security identity evolved, but an 
antimilitaristic aspect remains thanks to political parties’ interactions.    
1. Discussion within the Ruling Parties 
In facing the national security tragedy of its alliance partner, Tokyo had a sense of 
obligation to respond promptly to define the crisis as a “significant emergency,” one 
needed to be coped with using all possible means, including those other than 
diplomatic.284  In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Prime Minister Koizumi completely 
aligned with the reprisals of the U.S. and condemned the terrorists’ attack, as did most 
countries’ leaders.  On September 25, 2001, Koizumi visited New York and Washington 
to show his deep sympathy and express his eagerness to support Japan’s ally as a 
responsible member of the international community; he said that Japan would “provide 
cooperation that suits its national power.”285   
The day after the attacks, Koizumi confidentially ordered Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Yasuo Fukuda to consider dispatching the SDF.286  Inside the cabinet office, Deputy 
Cabinet Chief Secretary (DCCS) Furukawa Teijiro organized a task force to identify 
possible Japanese responses. They outlined the SDF’s logistical support on September 15. 
Koizumi, one of the leading revisionists, was the most fervent advocate of the plan.  In 
his Diet speech, he reiterated that Japan should be “ready to take drastic and flexible 
measures depending on the economic situation.”287  Government officials were highly 
motivated to support Koizumi’s initiatives, and publicly announced: “if a new law is 
sought and then attacks or other events happen before the law is passed, the SDF may be 
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dispatched without legal grounds.”288  When designing initial plans, the cabinet policy 
makers appeared to follow the LDP revisionists’ positions.  On September 19, 2001, 
Prime Minister Koizumi officially announced a “seven-point plan” to assist the U.S.-led 
“‘war on terror.”  The specific plans were to:289  
 Take steps to enable the SDF to provide logistical support to the U.S. 
military in  the event of a retaliatory strike in areas such as medical 
services, transportation and logistics;  
 Dispatch SDF ships to gather information; 
 Further strengthen international co-operation over immigration control; 
 Provide humanitarian and economic aid to neighboring and involved 
countries, including the provision of emergency economic assistance to 
Pakistan and India; 
 Take steps to help refugees, who might flee areas affected by the potential 
U.S.-military action, possibly as part of humanitarian aid by the SDF; 
 Cooperate with other countries and take “appropriate steps” so that there 
would be no disorder in the economic system of Japan or the rest of the 
world. 
They also planned a detailed military profile for the dispatch.290  The initial plan 
included the MSDF fleet and P-3Cs and Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) C-130Hs and 
Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACSs).  The fleet would consist of the 
amphibious vessel Osumi, Aegis destroyers, and tankers to support the shipment of water, 
food, and medical supplies including the refueling of U.S. fleets in the Indian Ocean.  
The MSDF P-3Cs and ASDF AWACSs would watch over the surrounding waters for 
intelligence gathering.  The ASDF C-130H would be expected to support humanitarian 
aid and transportation.  
Although, the government plan departed from the traditional pattern of Japanese 
security practice, there was no doubt that the devised SDF missions were confined to the 
context of noncombat rear-area logistic support for the U.S.-led military campaign, 
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primarily in intelligence gathering and humanitarian aid (medical services and 
transportation).  In the initial plan, the government imposed limits on the mission type 
and scope when the SDF was to be conducting logistic support.  In terms of type of 
missions, the SDF mission was rear-area logistical support rather than a combat mission, 
and the SDF was charged with refueling and medical and maintenance support only for 
U.S. allies in Indian Ocean.  In terms of scope of action, the SDF was allowed to operate 
only in non-combat areas; the bill explicitly stipulated that these measures would be 
applied only to non-combat areas.291  However, pragmatist groups in the LDP and its 
coalition party, the Komeito, found the plan problematic. 
Pragmatist groups in the LDP, with their different security policy principles, 
criticized the government’s decisions.  Faced with the government plan, one powerful 
Hashimoto faction member, Hiromu Nonaka, warned, “While I am well aware of the 
importance of cooperating with Japan’s ally, I can’t help but think that the government 
shouldn’t jeopardize the foreign policy it has worked long and hard to formulate.”292  
LDP Secretary General Taku Yamansaki, a leading pragmatist, reiterated that “Japan’s 
role in preventing a global economic slide is as important as dispatching the SDF 
overseas.”293  This statement made clear one aspect of the pragmatists’ security policy 
stance, which favored economic assistance over military cooperation.  In particular, the 
LDP pragmatists brought the mission type and capabilities that the SDF would expect to 
engage into question.  The Koizumi government announced that AWACS and P-3C units 
were prepared to dispatch along with Aegis destroyers for monitoring outside combat 
areas and to take on information-gathering missions in surrounding areas.294  However, 
pragmatist groups objected.  Koichi Kato, a leader of the former Miyazawa faction and  
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head of the Lower House Counterterrorism Committee, expressed his concern that 
“dispatch of an Aegis destroyer would lead Arab nations to believe that Japan has 
provided over-bearing military assistance.”295   
In response to the pragmatists’ opposition, the government dropped the AWACS 
and P-3C options, but the Aegis option was still maintained.296  At the LDP General 
Council meeting (members included former secretary generals of the LDP) held on 
September 26, pragmatist Nonaka publicly objected to the Aegis dispatch: “If the 
dispatch of an Aegis ship becomes too controversial and Diet debate becomes heated, the 
government should postpone the dispatch for the time being.”297  But the issue of an 
Aegis dispatch remained unsettled more than one year later.  Due to strong opposition 
from pragmatists, the government did not dispatch an Aegis destroyer298; however, the 
issue again came to the forefront in December 2002, and eventually resulted in sending 
two Aegis destroyers in rotation for eight months.299  Aegis destroyers were equipped 
with the Aegis war-fighting system capable of a high level of combat operations.  Thus, 
in the pragmatists’ view, dispatching the Aegis was not allowable as the ship might be 
easily entrapped to engage in combat.  By this logic, the pragmatist group disliked the 
government’s decision to dispatch Aegis destroyers.  In the end, the Japanese government 
could afford to dispatch them when the hostile combat phase had cooled and thus the risk 
to engage in combat remained low.300 
The junior party, Komeito, also took a cautious approach.  Komeito, with its 
pacifist security policy stance in principle, was concerned about the broader interpretation 
of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance.  Komeito’s Secretary General Tetsuzo Fuyushiba 
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stated, “We cannot accept the idea that the SDF will be allowed to offer support to U.S. 
forces anywhere they go.”301  After the government plan was promulgated, the leader of 
Komeito, Takenori Kanzaki, announced the conditions the Komeito could agree to in the 
government plan: 302  
 Providing logistic support, such as transportation and supplies, based on a 
U.N. resolution. 
 Creating a law that is effective for a limited period of time and pertains 
only to the current military action. 
Komeito’s interpretation was that no U.N. resolution clearly had authorized U.S. 
military operations; therefore, by suggesting certain conditions, Komeito pushed the 
government to present a clear means of legitimizing SDF participation. Moreover, the 
demand for a limited period of time limited the SDF dispatch to a case-by-case basis.  
Additionally, Komeito noted that the bill did not prohibit the SDF from transporting 
weapons and ammunition in support of U.S. forces preparing for combat missions.303 
As a result of political debates among the revisionist government, pragmatist 
groups, and the coalition party, on September 25, a consensus was reached about the 
revised bill to permit rear-area logistic support for U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and 
humanitarian aid to refugees.  In response to concerns from the pragmatist groups and its 
coalition partner, the Koizumi government committed to three items.  First, it imposed a 
“two-year time limit” on the deployment plan.304   Two years after the start of the 
operation, the law would need to be endorsed again by Diet members to continue as long 
as the missions were not terminated.   
Second, the phrase “Nonetheless, weapons and ammunition shall not be provided.  
Direct refueling to and repairing of U.S. aircraft which is preparing for departure for 
combat operations shall not be conducted” was newly inserted.305  It promised that SDF 
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forces would not assist U.S. aircraft or other weapon systems ready for combat 
missions.306  Also limited was the type of military platform: specifically, due to the 
pragmatist groups’ opposition, AWACSs for intelligence-gathering and P-3Cs for 
maritime patrol were forbidden.  In the case of the Aegis destroyer dispatch, agreement 
by the pragmatist groups and the revisionist government was hard to come by.  In the end, 
one year later, with MSDF being the most capable asset, the Aegis destroyers were 
dispatched in the Indian Ocean.  However, the Aegis dispatch was suspended during the 
combat phase, and was allowed to continue only after the dangers of engaging in combat 
operations were marginalized.   
Third, the discussion about the SDF dispatch was not linked with constitutional 
revision.  As Article 9 of the Constitution was interpreted as “no right of exercising 
collective self-defense,” the SDF dispatch might have represented a violation.307  In this 
context, Komeito posed critical questions about the legitimacy of the missions.  In 
response, the Koizumi government made it clear that the SDF dispatch did not challenge 
the constitutional prohibition that had confined the role of Japanese military forces, 
because it was based on U.N. Resolution 1368, which defined a terrorist attack as a threat 
to international peace and stability. 308  In addition, the government tried to turn the focus 
of the Constitution from Article 9 to the Preamble, which stipulated that the Japanese 
people should cooperate with international nations for peace. 309   Based on U.N. 
resolutions and the Preamble of the Constitution, it was argued that the legitimacy of the 
SDF dispatch had been established.   
In the end, LDP Secretaries General and the policy committee chairmen of the 
ruling parties approved the bill and reached a consensus on October 1.  The discussion 
implied that the government’s initial plan and the bill were constrained by restrictions 
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imposed by the pragmatist groups of the LDP and the coalition party.  The imposed 
restrictions reflected the antimilitaristic approach to security matters of the Japanese 
government as well as that of the Japanese parties.    
2. Discussion with Opposition Parties 
On October 5, the Anti-terrorism Special Measure bill was delivered to the Diet. 
In terms of degree of opposition, the strongest opposition parties were the SDPJ and the 
JCP, which wanted no compromise on the issue of the SDF dispatch under any conditions.  
The JCP asserted that any form of military assistance, regardless of U.N. guidance or 
internationally built consensus, was unconstitutional.310   The SDPJ also firmly opposed 
all forms of military retaliatory engagement whether or not the objectives of the missions 
were limited to humanitarian aid in a non-combat area.311  Their positions were symbolic 
in that they represented the antimilitarism embedded in Japanese politics, but their 
political power was too weak to produce all the changes they wanted.   
Unlike the SDPJ’s and the JCP’s extreme oppositions, the Liberal Party and the 
DPJ, in principle, welcomed the SDF’s expanded roles.  However, their rationales and 
conditions for agreeing to widened military roles differed.  The Liberal Party’s positions 
were less flexible than those of the DPJ.  According to the Liberal Party’s basic stance on 
the use of force abroad, SDF participation in international security affairs should take 
precedence over U.N. sanctions.  Unlike the Gulf War case, the U.S.-led military 
operation in Afghanistan was not a U.N.-commanded multinational military operation, 
and no specific U.N. resolution mandated the U.S.-led military campaign.  The Liberal 
Party leader, Ozawa, pointed to this fact, and boycotted the party leaders’ meeting on 
September 20.312  He constantly argued that: “in order to enact the bill, a fresh U.N. 
resolution that would enable the exercise of forces is needed.  If this is not possible, the 
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government should amend its current interpretation of the Constitution that denies 
exercising the right of collective self-defense to allow the SDF to join U.S. and 
multinational forces with no restrictions on their activities.” 313   In the face of the 
government’s prompt reaction and the bill presented to the Diet, offered held that this 
was an “ad hoc, spur of the moment half measure.” 314  However, the Liberal Party did 
not directly influence modification of the government’s decision, primarily because, as a 
minor party in terms of seat numbers in the Diet (22 of 480), Liberal Party concerns were 
a low priority.    
DPJ members split into two factions with different positions.  Those who were 
former socialists opposed the bill, whereas the leading group, including party leader 
Hatoyama, accepted the need to join international efforts to fight terrorism.  This did not 
mean that the positions of the DPJ, which favored the bill, had no influence on 
government measures.  In the meeting between the ruling parties and the DPJ, the DPJ 
demanded conditions required to obtain the party’s support.   
The first thing the DPJ demanded was to amend the bill to limit the scope of the 
SDF to non-combat areas for humanitarian aid activities.315  The DPJ was concerned 
about the “dispatch of SDF personnel.”316  The bill granted authority to SDF personnel to 
operate in a foreign territory where enemies were not easily discernable, even though the 
mission areas were restricted to non-combat areas.  Far more importantly, SDF personnel 
were allowed to carry weapons for self-protection and to protect those whom they were 
charged with protecting, such as refugees and the wounded.  The DPJ wanted the bill to 
add certain limitations to protect SDF personnel.  It proposed forbidding them from 
transporting weapons and ammunitions for coalition forces by land.  
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The second point that the DPJ highlighted was prior Diet approval in any SDF 
dispatch cases to ensure “strong civilian control.”317  The proposed bill did not require a 
prior Diet approval for enforcement, but only a post-Diet report.318   As a majority 
opposition party in the Diet, the DPJ called for strong Diet control.  DPJ’s preference for 
prior Diet approval contradicted that of the junior coalition party, Komeito, which firmly 
asserted that no further compromise with the DPJ related to Diet approval would be 
granted.319  In the end, a Lower House Committee approved the government bill without 
accepting the DPJ’s demand.320   
Although the government draft bill followed a fairly antimilitaristic approach by 
compromising with pragmatist groups and the coalition party, there was room for 
opposition parties with different viewpoints to contribute.  Their basic stances on military 
roles in international security affairs guided their positions on government decisions to 
dispatch the SDF.  In addition to the parties’ behavior based on policy-seeking patterns, 
the debate in the Diet seemed to become more complicated because of the opposition 
party’s struggle to exert more influence in the Diet in the name of “civilian control.”   
In response to the opposition parties’ requests, the governing parties agreed to 
amend the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure bill.  First, the bill drew an explicit line 
between land and sea-airspace missions.  Transporting weapons and ammunition on land 
was clearly prohibited in the amended bill. 321   Thanks to the DPJ’s direction, the 
probability of SDF members being in a dangerous situation that would call for the use of 
weapons was lowered.  Second, Koizumi pledged to implement the provision that 
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stipulated post-Diet approval within twenty days.322  In addition, this provision decreed 
that “if the Diet disapproved the SDF activities which had already been executed, of SDF 
mission would be terminated immediately.”323  As a result of the insertion of the Diet’s 
right to approve or disapprove the mission in the bill, civilian control over the military 
engagement was further reinforced.   
Despite the government’s concessions to the demands of the main opposition 
party, efforts to reach an agreement between the ruling parties and the DPJ ended in 
failure, due mainly to the unsatisfactory compromise over Diet approval.324  DPJ leader 
Hatoyama constantly called for prior Diet approval in conducting SDF missions abroad.  
This call was rebuffed Hatoyama finally altered his party’s line.  Although originally 
supporting the government, the DPJ stood against the bill at the last minute.325   
Nevertheless, the Koizumi government rushed to vote with support from ruling 
party members.326  In the Lower and Upper Houses, the LDP and its coalition held a 
majority and public support of the anti-terrorism legislation remained high.  According to 
an Asahi Shimbun poll on October 13–14, over half of respondents (51 percent) 
supported the bill, while 29 percent opposed it.327  The high rate of public support and 
that U.S. retaliatory actions had already begun ultimately convinced the Koizumi 
government to quickly pass the bill in spite of the unsuccessful compromise with the DPJ.  
Meanwhile, Hatoyama’s call for prior Diet approval failed to gain full support from even 
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his own party members.  The DPJ was composed of several factions whose origins varied, 
and thus at the time of the SDF discussion, Hatoyama found it difficult to create party 
unity.328  In the end, Hatoyama failed to persuade members who agreed with the SDF’s 
dispatch abroad; as a result, twenty members of the DPJ voted to pass the bill.329  The bill 
passed in the Lower House on October 18 and in the Upper House on October 29.  
Subsequent to enacting the law on November 2, the MSDF flotilla left its home port for 
the Indian Ocean on November 9, 2001. 
 E. CONCLUSION  
Substantial changes after the Cold War in the regional security environment 
caused by North Korea and China resulted in a shift of Japanese threat perception 
ultimately resulting in more consolidated relations between the U.S. and Japan in the 
1990s.  A stronger alliance was the starting point that motivated the U.S. to anticipate a 
more active role for Japan, which, at the same time, motivated Japan to take on greater 
responsibilities.  Following the 9/11 disaster, the Koizumi government decisively and 
promptly took action as an alliance partner and as a responsible member of the 
international community.  An increased number of public supporters galvanized the 
government’s prompt decision-making.   
Koizumi played a critical role in Japan’s quick reaction.  He initiated the plan and 
instructed cabinet officials to draft the basic plan and anti-terrorism legislation.  From the 
revisionists’ view, the U.S.-Japan alliance was an institutional framework to make 
military contributions over the world.  As a key proponent of revisionism in the LDP, 
Koizumi certainly advocated for SDF’s expanded roles in international security affairs 
and insisted on constructing a sound relationship with the U.S. as a responsible ally.  He 
and his cabinet officials’ basic plan was a more radical departure from what Japan finally 
decided upon, in that they planned to dispatch Aegis destroyers along with P-3Cs and 
AWACS.  Pragmatist groups in the LDP warned against taking too radical a step toward 
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military operations alongside U.S.-led multinational forces and opposed the use of Aegis 
destroyers, AWACS, and P-3Cs.  Komeito’s security stance opposed ammunition and 
called for weapons and its will to establish legal barriers against automatic long-lasting 
support for U.S. military operations.  The DPJ’s positions coincided with the revisionists’ 
in principle as far as expanded military roles were concerned.  Furthermore, they wanted 
to reduce the possibility that SDF personnel were to be placed in dangerous situations.  In 
addition, the DPJ wanted more institutionalized tools to ensure civilian control. The 
Liberal Party’s opposition also showed that their basic principles on security policy 
influenced the deciding party’s official positions on the security matters.  For the Liberal 
Party, despite its favor of international military contributions in any form of operations, 
the U.N. mandate was the biggest leverage to draw the party’s approval.  Pacifist parties, 
the SDPJ, and the JCP completely opposed the legislation.   
Throughout postwar history, “no Japanese participation in foreign wars” was one 
of the underpinning tenets of the Japanese security identity of domestic antimilitarism.  In 
this respect, the SDF dispatch in support of U.S.-led coalition forces in 2001 reflected 
Japanese departure from the previous antimilitaristic approach to security policy practice.  
However, the security identity of no use of force in foreign wars evolved with a set of 
constraints imposed throughout the political process through which decision-makers 
devised initial plans and political parties interact.  Political parties’ respective positions 
offered basic principles by which the parties’ support might be secured to pass the bill.  
In its series of political negotiations with the coalition and opposition parties, the 
government’s original initiatives were repeatedly imbued with different aspects of 
restrictions deriving from the different origins of parties’ antimilitaristic identities.  As a 
result, in many ways, their previous identity with the ban on participation in foreign wars 
remained consistent with the imposition of constraints by decision-makers as well as 
opposition parties.  Although the situation in the wake of 9/11 challenged antimilitaristic 
aspects of Japan’s security identity, Japan eventually preserved influences of 
antimilitarism in its security policy.  As long as the democratic political system operates 
well enough to ensure dynamic political negotiations, Japanese dependence on 
antimilitarism in security areas will likely endure without radical changes. 
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As noted in the prior chapter, one function of security identity is to provide a set 
of boundaries under which states shape security policies.  The Japanese decision on the 
SDF dispatch was a turning point for Japan.  It broke the old boundaries and produced 
new principles to guide security practice in a new era.  The new principles can be 
summarized as follows.  First, foreign deployment would be implemented within bi- or 
multilateral framework.  Second, there must be a strong enough reason for legitimizing 
the use of force abroad to build a consensus.  Third, the decision to deploy the SDF 
would be made on a case-by-case-basis, and thus the decision would need the support of 
the Diet.  Fourth, foreign deployment of the SDF would be limited to non-combat 
missions.  In this manner, one tenet of the Japanese security identity—no Japanese 
participation in foreign wars—has evolved.  The new security identity guides Japanese 
new way of security practice. 330  But, there is no doubt that to a considerable extent, the 
past pattern of security practices will remain consistent despite this evolved security 
identity because of a new set of principles that constrain Japanese decision making.  
The politics of Japan can be described as a politics of trade-offs.  As long as the 
representative government is functioning well, no dominant party’s positions entirely 
determine the outcome of government policy. Japanese parties are sharply divided over 
issues of national security and have different views on the U.S.-Japan alliance system, the 
role of the SDF, and the legitimacy of international military contributions.  The dispatch 
of the SDF in support of U.S.-led coalition forces in the war against terrorism explicitly 
demonstrates how parties’ basic positions and principles meld into security policy 
outcomes.  In addition, this case study indicates how parties interact in the face of critical 
security matters and search for common ground.  As policy-seekers argued, parties’ basic 
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principles on security matters guided the government’s course of action with respect to 
the SDF dispatch, and each party voiced its stance on the government plan based on their 







Japan and Germany developed security identities of domestic antimilitarism in the 
postwar era.  One of the important tenets of their security identities was not to use their 
militaries other than for defense purposes.  However, those security identities of “no use 
of forces in foreign war” were challenged under the new security environments created 
by the end of the Cold War and the reunification of the two German states.  Political 
parties in Japan and Germany took leading roles in all processes of responding to the 
challenges and built new security identities modifying “no use of forces in foreign war.”  
Before Japan and Germany participated in their two “modern” wars, they had had no 
framework to guide the direction of their decision making.  The two wars provided 
opportunities for politicians from both countries to reconstruct their security identities of 
domestic antimilitarism in the post-Cold War era.   
The two cases examined above illustrate what role Japanese and German political 
parties played in the evolution of their security identities.  The case studies showed that 
understanding parties’ behaviors in the legislative arena is a key to figuring out how new 
security practices were adopted, implemented, and institutionalized.  In addition, there 
were similarities as well as dissimilarities between the two cases of Japan and Germany 
in terms of political parties’ views and behavior patterns in policy competition.   
First of all, this thesis finds that as a representative of the public, the ruling party, 
as well as opposition parties, chose to take action concerning the use of forces abroad in 
accordance with public opinion.  Public opinion influenced each party’s decision whether 
to take an action or not (rather than how to take an action in the face of challenges).  
Public opinion made political parties drew a broad picture with regard to the nations’ 
responses rather than give such directions as specific policies.  Since their defeats in 
WWII, the Japanese and Germans adhered to a strong sense of aversion to the military, 
and that exerted political influence in security decision-making related to military options.  
But public opinion was seen to shift according to the specific situation—e.g., critical 
violations of human rights in the form of massacres, attacks on U.N. peacekeepers, and 
terrorist attacks.  Also, public opinion appeared to move toward a conditional acceptance 
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of the use of force for the maintenance of international peace and stability.  Although 
public opinion was shaped in favor of the use of military force at the point of time when 
two wars occurred, as shown in polls, the gap between approval and disapproval of 
military deployment was small.  Therefore, it was the role of political parties to elicit 
public support by crafting acceptable policy packages and presenting them to the public.  
In that regard, when it came to detailing policies, public opinion does not fully explain 
why one party favored a certain policy while others did not.  
Second, the thesis finds that as policy makers, political parties set their own 
lenses for discerning desirable national identities and favorable ways of dealing with 
security issues.  When it came to delineating specific reactions and military deployments 
under the given circumstances, parties’ established stances on security matters played a 
big part.  Parties keep consistent policy stances over time, and these were created mostly 
when the parties were founded.  The two nations’ parties had this in common.  From their 
foundations (mostly in the early postwar years), each party established conditions under 
which it had to embrace a sense of antimilitarism and write new national identities that 
directed their future as vanquished nations.  Those parties’ stances were the main pillars 
of the two nations’ security identities, and these were formulated and consolidated down 
through the years since the end of WWII.    
These antimilitaristic policy stances of political parties exerted substantial impact 
parties’ discussions on positions on the use of force in foreign wars.  The ruling parties’ 
positions derived from their willingness to fulfill allegiance obligations.  This was not 
motivated by national interests in international relations or by demonstrating military 
power to neighbor nations.  Also, opposition parties’ concession to war participation was 
centered on humanitarian purposes and preservation of peace and stability.  This shows 
that although they were pushed to rewrite their new security identities of domestic 
antimilitarism, political parties’ respective positions did not depart from the existing 
boundaries of antimilitarism.  It is wise to think that as long as parties’ positions are 
confined within boundaries imbued with antimilitarism, war participation will not result 
in a complete overturn of existing security identity or radical decline of postwar 
reluctance to become involved in foreign war.   
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Moreover, as seen in the case studies, the governments’ initiatives entailed self-
imposed restrictions on military support.  The governments of Japan and Germany were 
cautious when choosing the capabilities to be used in military interventions.  The German 
government did not discuss ground force participation in the UNPROFOR operation, 
even though the operation was under the guardianship of the U.N.  In the case of Japan, 
SDF support was limited to non-combat roles and non-substitution roles for U.S. forces.  
The government gave up dispatching a Kongo class Aegis destroyer equipped with war 
fighting systems, and dropped dispatching P-3Cs and AWACSs which were expected to 
conduct patrol missions for war surveillance.  This trend formed the backbone of the new 
security practice guided by the new security identity of “use of force in foreign war.” 
Third, the thesis finds that as policy competitors, political parties created their 
preferred policy through negotiations and compromises.   These processes made the final 
decision-making on war participation constrained as well as delayed.  In the case of Japan, 
participation in the Afghanistan war was limited to only two years, and ships were not 
allowed to engage in combat missions.  In the case of Germany, in the early stage of the 
Bosnian War period, German participation was limited to peacekeeping operations for 
humanitarian relief, and decision-making was substantially delayed due to opposition 
parties’ filing of legal suits.  The most salient accomplishment of both nations’ opposition 
parties in policy competition was to place decision-making on military intervention under 
civilian control on a case-by-case-basis.  Japan imposed post hoc Diet approval as a way 
to ensure civilian control.  The law included a provision stipulating that unless this 
approval was obtained, troops had to be withdrawn.  The ruling from the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in 1994 endowed German politicians with official authority to 
decide on military intervention in each case.  The two nations’ political balances of 
power led policy competition to take place.  If the political environment had involved 
overwhelming dominance of a monolithic ruling party, the institutionalization of civilian 
control or institutionalization of the role of parliament would have been substantially 
reduced.   
The case studies of Japan and Germany reveal both similarities and dissimilarities 
in the politics of military deployment.  First of all, the two nations had similar patterns of 
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party alignments of views on national identities and major security issues.  Dominant 
political parties in the early postwar period, the CDU and the pragmatist LDP, both 
conceived that new types of nations should be established based on the concept of non-
military regimes.  During the Cold War, they completely distanced themselves from 
military power politics and pursued civilian politics focusing on economic development.  
In addition to this, their security activities were taken within multi- or bilateral security 
frameworks.  By contrast, the major opposition parties, the SPD and JSP, favored 
neutralized socialist national identities.  They both criticized the governing parties’ 
alliance-leaning strategies in the pursuit of national security and envisioned more 
autonomous status as a plausible way to ensure national security.  The two main 
opposition parties’ preferences for national identities and policy stances represented the 
embodiment of antimilitarism in realpolitik. 
Second, political parties in Japan and Germany aligned similarly in their view on 
the major security-policy issue of widened military roles.  In discussing participation in 
foreign wars, the ruling parties, the CDU and the revisionist LDP, emphasized alliance 
solidarity including military interventions on a preferential basis; and the opposition 
parties, the SPD and the DPJ, were skeptical about alliance solidarity through military 
means.  Rather, opposition parties sought legitimacy to use military force abroad in the 
name of preserving peace and stability.  Dissimilar was the fact that in the case of 
Germany, the long-time anti-militarist party, the SPD, which was reorganized in the 
immediate postwar period, still kept its position as a major party; whereas in the case of 
Japan, the postwar major opposition party, the JSP, had grown almost defunct.  Instead, a 
newly founded party, the DPJ, whose members fell across the wide range of the 
ideological spectrum, newly functioned as a main opposition party at the time when the 
SDF dispatch debate took place.  Thus, SPD’s opposition was based on its well-
developed traditional stance on the use of force, but that of the DPJ was based on its 
nascent stance on the matter.  Additionally, the main leadership posts of the DPJ were 
taken by former conservatives as of 2001, and thus the DPJ’s stance was more favorable 
to internationalized military activities.  In this sense, the degree of opposition of Japanese 
parties was far less strong than that of Germany’s.    
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Third, the two nations displayed unique patterns of policy competition.  German 
parties delegated authority to the Federal Constitutional Court when they could not 
resolve political controversy.  This behavior gave the Federal Constitutional Court a 
considerable political role in German politics.  Thanks to the opposition parties’ inquiries 
regarding the constitutionality of the mission, the Federal Court finally concluded, in July 
1994, that the military deployment in out-of-area missions was constitutional.  From then 
on, though political dispute about military deployments was not confined within the 
constitutional context.  Decisions on military deployment depended much on politicians’ 
interactions on a case-by-case-basis.  After the court ruling, German politicians officially 
formulated clear criteria that guide future German military engagements.  Meanwhile, 
Japanese opposition parties’ boycotted or directly voted against the bill in the legislative 
arena.  The main opposition party paid little attention to the constitutional justice of the 
mission, unlike Germany’s major opposition party.  Therefore, in Japanese politics, the 
Supreme Court had a smaller political role.  In contrast to the German case where the 
constitutional dispute was settled by court ruling in 1994, constitutional ambiguity with 
regard to Japanese military engagements in collective security was still unsettled.  This 
result made Japanese political parties’ roles as policy makers and policy competitors 
more significant.   
Fourth, the two cases differed in terms of distance of mission.  German 
participation occurred in nearby European regions, ones it had occupied in the WWII 
period.  German military engagement in these European areas was possible because of a 
consensus by alliance nations to allow Germany military access.  This was a radical 
change given European nations’ high level of resentment against Germany in the 
immediate postwar period.  On the contrary, Japanese participation occurred hundreds of 
miles away.  If Japan had been faced with the German situation and the war had taken 
place in the Japanese occupied areas of WWII, Japan would have been less likely to 
participate in such a war, as Germany did, even given U.N. sanctioned security activities.  
The Japanese relationship with neighbor nations, especially with China and Korea, is still 
entangled with history textbook controversies, high political figures’ visit to the 
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controversial Shrine, and the absence of clear apologies for Japanese deeds during WWII.  
These problems would a large strain on a Japanese military role in its own region.   
In conclusion, through their “modern” wars, Japan’s and Germany’s security 
identities of “no use of force in foreign war” evolved.  In the evolution process, political 
parties developed a new framework to guide future military interventions in foreign wars.  
The new framework can be summarized as follows.  First, there must be a consensus 
among the people that the military deployment would contribute to the preservation of 
international peace and stability.  Second, foreign deployment would be implemented 
only when missions were conducted within a bilateral or multilateral context.  
Acceptance of the military deployment would be increased when the U.N. mandated the 
mission.  Third, the decision to deploy military troops would be made through civilian 
control in the form parliamentary approval on a case-by-case-basis.  New security 
identities have guided decision-making over Japan’s and Germany’s expanded 
multilateral security roles.    
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